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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBER
REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICIALS WITH THE




Modern states possess wide jurisdictional authority over their na-
tional domain.' This authority normally extends to persons, both
nationals and aliens, residing within a country and to property lo-
cated therein. That a nation rules over all persons and things within
its territory constitutes one of the basic principles of international
law.2 For a variety of reasons, however, states have accepted limita-
tions upon their jurisdiction. One of these limitations is the special
legal status of diplomatic representatives.' Under customary interna-
tional law, diplomatic envoys are granted certain privileges and im-
munities from the normal legal processes of the state to which they
are accredited. The concept of diplomatic immunity constitutes one
of the oldest parts of international law, originating even before the
rise of the modern state.'
Since the end of World War I, a new type of international entity
has appeared in the form of the international organization. In order
to function effectively, these organizations must enjoy a large degree
*Director of International Studies, Franklin College, Franklin, Indiana. A.B.,
LL.B. (1963), Soochow University, Taipei, Formosa; LL.M. (1967), M.A. (1968), Ph.D.
(1973), University of Indiana at Bloomington.
1H. BIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 298 (2d ed. 1952). The comprehensive nature of
territorial jurisdiction has been characterized by C. Hyde: "Within the national do-
main the will of the territorial sovereign is supreme." 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CHIEFLY AS INTERPETED AND APPLIED BY ME UNrrED STATES 640 (2d ed. 1947).
2For illustrative materials on the principle of territorial supremacy, see 2 J.
MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 175 et seq. (1906).
3When agreement is reached on the question of opening of diplomatic relations,
the next matter considered is the exchange of representatives. National representatives
sent by one state to another to conduct diplomatic affairs are called "diplomatic
agents." Article 1, paragraph (e), of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions defines a "diplomatic agent" as "the head of the mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission." Vienna Convention Diplomatic Relations, done April
18, 1961, in force April 24, 1964, [1972] 3 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S.
95 [hereinafter cited to U.N.T.S. only].
'For a detailed study of the origin, growth, and purposes of the historical bases of
diplomatic immunity, see M. OGDON, BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNrrY (1936).
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of freedom from interference by individual sovereigns. Consequently,
questions concerning the legal status of these international organiza-
tions, the extent of the privileges and immunities of national repre-
sentatives to such organizations, and the extent of the privileges and
immunities of international officials employed by the organizations
have acquired increasing importance. Though the United Nations is
only one of many international organizations, the problems which its
existence has created in this area are representative of those experi-
enced by other international institutions. An analysis of the legal
status of United Nations Member representatives and officials illus-
trates the differences and similarities between the traditional privi-
leges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents and the func-
tional privileges and immunities accorded to these new privileged
groups.
II. LEGAL STATUS OF MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
In the twenty six years that the United Nations has resided in
New York, there has been little publicity regarding the privileges and
immunities of its Member representatives. Few untoward incidents
have occurred; the public is generally unaware of the difference be-
tween the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents accredited
to a host state and those of Member representatives accredited to the
United Nations. Because of this lack of understanding, it is often
assumed that the privileges and immunities of Member representa-
tives are the same as those of diplomatic agents.
This erroneous notion is not totally without foundation. Tradi-
tionally, Member representatives to international conferences or to
international organizations were treated as members of diplomatic
missions.5 For example, the juridical basis of the privileges and im-
munities of Member representatives to the League of Nations, as set
forth in paragraph 4 of article 7 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, stipulated that Member representatives and League offi-
cials should enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities.
5W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 365 (8th ed. 1924).
&LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 7, states that "[r]epresentatives of the mem-
bers of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the
League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities."
7rhe report of Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, which was adopted by the San
Francisco Conference, includes the following comment:
In order to determine the nature of the privileges and immunities,
the Committee has seen fit to avoid the term 'diplomatic' and has
preferred to substitute a more appropriate standard, based, for the
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
In-contrast, article 105 paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter
does not grant full diplomatic privileges and immunities: "Repre-
sentatives of the Members of the United Nations . . .shall similarly
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the inde-
pendent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organiza-
tion." It is clear that the draftsmen of the United Nations Charter
were not sure that the term "diplomatic" would be appropriate in
this article. They rejected the traditional rationale and adopted a
functional principle as the legal basis for granting privileges and
immunities to Member representatives.7
From primitive times, man has extended certain rights and privi-
leges to representatives of other political groups in order to facilitate
interaction for mutual benefit. A dozen or more legal theories have
been advanced to justify the extension of diplomatic privileges and
immunities.8 In general, however, legal scholars rely upon one of three
commonly accepted theories to explain why diplomatic privileges and
immunities should exist: "The three most important doctrines, which
have all played a role in the development of the law, are the doctrines
of the representative character of diplomatic agents, the fiction of
exterritoriality, and the functional theory."9
The theory of exterritoriality followed in the wake of sixteenth
century ideas of territorial sovereignty and exaggerated diplomatic
privileges. Exterritoriality means that diplomatic envoys must be
treated as if they are still living in the territory of the sending state.'
This theory is based upon two principles: (1) the concept of resi-
dence-the diplomatic agent is not subject to local law because he
does not reside in the host territory; and (2) the correlative concept
of territory-the local authority considers the diplomatic premises to
be foreign territory." This theory has been seriously criticized by legal
purposes of the Organization, on the necessity of realizing its purposes
and, in the case of the representatives of its members and the officials
of the Organization, on providing for the independent exercise of their
functions.
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San
Francisco, Vol. L3 at 704 (1945).
8HAvARD LAw SCHOOL, Research in International Law: Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. (1932). E.g., the theory of necessity, the theory of
exterritoriality, the respresentative theory, the theory of the right of legation, and the
theory of function.
'Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. J. INT'L
L. 828, 837 (1947).
"See BRIGGS, supra note 1.
"See OGDON, supra note 4, at 80.
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scholars 2 and attacked by the courts of different countries and has
slowly fallen into disuse.
Under the representative theory, the diplomatic agent is the per-
sonification of his ruler or of a sovereign state whose independence
must be respected. Many references to this concept are found in
literature dealing with diplomatic law and it has to a great extent
superseded the theory of exterritoriality. While the representative
theory furnishes a sound legal foundation for the universally admit-
ted exemption of diplomats from the authority of the receiving state
for acts performed within their official capacity, the corresponding
immunities accorded to the diplomatic agent's family, secretarial
staff and ordinary servants, and to his own private acts are not sup-
ported by the representative theory. These latter immunities appear
to be remnants of the traditional, exterritoriality theory.
A third theory appears most appropriate for modern times. Due
to the complexity of international affairs, nations have expanded the
size of their diplomatic missions. Consequently, there has been a
tremendous increase in the number of persons claiming diplomatic
immunity. For the sake of security, host states have endeavored to
keep the number of people enjoying privileges and immunities to a
minimum. The functional necessity theory can be utilized to effect
the most desirable balance between privileges and immunities and
the requirements of host states. Statesmen and jurists since the post-
war period have widely adopted functional necessity as a theoretical
basis and have also utilized it as a test or standard for granting
privileges and immunities.
Along with the increase in the size of diplomatic missions, there
has been a rapid increase in the number of international organiza-
tions. Persons attached to international organizations, such as Mem-
"Id. See also A. HnsHEY, THE EssETIns OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc LAw (1912).
"Several foreign cases support the argument that the doctrine of exterritoriality
was disregarded by international practice. See, e.g., Trent v. Ragonesi, [1938] Ann.
Dig. 439 (Italy); Belgian State v. Marechal [1954] Ann. Dig. 249 (Belgium) (Belgian
embassy in Germany not "Belgian territory," and therefore filing of war reparation
claims precluded; "the parts of foreign territory in which international custom or
treaty gives Belgium rights of exterritoriality do not, by virtue of that fact, become
Belgian territory."); Status of Legation Buildings Case, [1930] Ann. Dig. 197 (Ger-
many) (plaintiff employed by German ambassador in London as a steward filed for
unemployment benefits under law which stipulated a period of prior German resi-
dence, claiming that as a member of the German diplomatic establishment abroad he
had in effect been residing on German soil; in holding that he was not entitled to the
benefits, the court noted that "the principle of exterritoriality does not include the
fiction that the house of the official representation is to be regarded as territory of the
sending state.").
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ber representatives and officials of international organizations, are
not covered by the exterritoriality and representative theories. Only
the functional necessity theory can adequately justify granting cer-
tain privileges and immunities to them. Because of these new devel-
opments, the draftsmen of the United Nations Charter adopted the
functional approach as the legal basis for granting privileges and
immunities to Member representatives. However, in practice this
functional approach has not been totally accepted. Certain represent-
atives, specifically permanent representatives, have been accorded
essentially the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic agents.
This inconsistency between principle and practice is attributable
to the different legal instruments which deal with the various types
of representatives. Under the League of Nations, there was no distinc-
tion between permanent representatives and those delegates attend-
ing international conferences with regard to privileges and immuni-
ties because both of these types of representatives were governed by
one single legal instrument-article 7, paragraph 4 of the Covenant.
But under the practice of the United Nations, there is a definite
distinction between the so-called permanent representatives, who are
stationed at the United Nations headquarters throughout the year,
and the temporary representatives, who are sent for the purposes of
attending particular sessions of the United Nations or ad hoc confer-
ences convened by the United Nations. Both are considered Member
representatives. However, the legal status of permanent representa-
tives is governed by the Headquarters Agreement concluded between
the United States and the United Nations in 1947,14 while the legal
status of temporary representatives is governed by the United Na-
tions Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946.11 Yet both the
Headquarters Agreement and the General Convention were enacted
for the purpose of implementing the general principle enunciated in
article 105 of the United Nations Charter. Thus, the inconsistency is
without legal justification since no such distinction was mentioned in
the United Nations Charter, which is the fundamental legal docu-
ment. This complicated situation can be understood only through a
careful examination of the relevant legal instruments.
"The Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations (Headquarters Agree-
ment) came into force on Nov. 21, 1947. For entire text see 61 Stat. 3416; T.I.A.S. 1676;
11 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited to U.N.T.S. only].
"The General Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on February 13, 1946. For text see 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
1976]
96 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
A. THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE STATUS OF MEMBER REP-
RESENTATIVES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
The status of Member representatives to the United Nations is
governed by four instruments: (1) the Charter of the United Nations,
in particular article 105, paragraph 2; (2) the United Nations Conven-
tion on Privileges and Immunities (1946); (3) the Headquarters
Agreement between the United States and the United Nations;'" and
(4) the Joint Resolution authorizing the President of the United
States to bring into effect the Headquarters Agreement." Since these
instruments all purport to govern the legal status of Member repre-
sentatives and since the validity of some is disputed, many inconsis-
tencies remain unresolved.
1. The Charter of the United Nations
Article 105 of the United Nations Charter"8 specifically provides
for certain privileges and immunities of the Organization and its
Member, representatives:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privi-
leges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with
a view to determining the details of the application of para-
graphs 1 and 2 of this Article, or may propose conventions to
the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.
The first and second paragraphs of Article 105 adopted the "func-
tional theory" as the legal basis for granting privileges and immuni-
ties to the Organization, its representatives and its officials-the lim-
its of the function constitute the extent of privileges and immunities
to be granted.
Paragraph 3 of article 105 gives the General Assembly the power
to make recommendations regarding privileges and immunities or to
"See note 14 supra.
'7 The President of the United States approved the Headquarters Agreement on
August 4, 1947. 61 Stat. 3437; 11 U.N.T.S. 11.
"Similar provisions on privileges and immunities are found in the constitutional
documents of other international organizations, such as the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.
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propose a convention which would require ratification by Member
States to become effective. The latter method would assume the form
of a multilateral treaty legally binding on all signatory states. The
General Assembly chose the convention alternative in 1946.11
2. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations
In accordance with article 105, paragraph 3, of the United Nations
Charter, the Preparatory Commission and the Geheral Assembly of
the United Nations studied the matter of privileges and immunities
for the United Nations and its personnel. It was decided that not only
was a general convention necessary to implement article 105 of the
Charter within the territories of its Members, but also that a special
agreement would have to be made with the country in which the
United Nations established its headquarters."0
The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions,2 usually referred to as the General Convention, was adopted
on February 13, 1946, by the General Assembly. The purpose of this
Convention is to give certain privileges and immunities to the United
Nations as an Organization, as well as to the representatives of Mem-
ber States, officials of the United Nations and experts on mission for
the United Nations. The privileges and immunities of Member repre-
sentatives to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Na-
tions and to conferences convened by the United Nations are gov-
erned by article IV of the General Convention. This article gives such
"In concluding the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions, the General Assembly provided the following justification:
(3). There were three main reasons for the conclusion of the Sub-
Committee. In the first place, it was thought that the immunities
necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the Organization and
the independent exercise of their functions by its officials and by the
representatives of Members should be laid down in a manner which
was as precise as possible. Secondly, that the method should be
adopted which would be likely to lead to the greatest uniformity in
application; and, thirdly, that the procedure should be such as best
to facilitate the passing by Members of the necessary domestic legisla-
tion.
1 U.N. GAOR Annex 3.
212 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 171 (1963).
2 The text of the General Convention was closely based on the text of the draft
convention on privileges and immunities in the report of the United Nations Prepara-
tory Commission. For the United Nations Preparatory Commission's recommenda-
tions concerning the privileges and immunities, including a draft convention, see the
Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. PC/20 at 60, 72 (1945).
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Member representatives a limited range of privileges and immunities
during their journeys to and from meetings.Y
-[1970] 2 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter cited to
U.N.T.S. only]. Article IV of the General Convention provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 11....
(a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of
their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written and
all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity
from legal process of every kind;
(b) Inviolability for all papers and documents;
(c) The right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by
courier or in sealed bags;
(d) Exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from immi-
gration restrictions, aliens registration or national service obligations
in the state they are visiting or through which they are passing in the
exercise of their functions;
(e) The same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions
as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments on tempo-
rary official missions;
(f) The same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys, and also;
(g) Such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsistent
with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that they shall
have no right to claim exemption from customs duties on goods im-
ported (otherwise than as part of their personal baggage) or from
excise duties or sales taxes.
SECTION 12. In order to secure, for the representatives of Members to
the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to
conferences convened by the United Nations, complete freedom of
speech and independence in the discharge of their duties, the immun-
ity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
done by them in discharging their duties shall continue to be ac-
corded, notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer the
representatives of Members.
SECTION 13. Where the incidence of any form of taxation depends upon
residence, periods during which the representatives of Members to the
principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to confer-
ences convened by the United Nations are present in a state for the
discharge of their duties shall not be considered as periods of resi-
dence.
SECION 14. Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representa-
tives of Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals them-
selves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the United Nations. Consequently a
Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the
immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the
Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can
be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity
is accorded.
SECTION 15. The provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 13 are not applicable
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More than 100 Member States have ratified this Convention,
though some have made certain declarations or reservations as to the
application of the Convention.? An important development which
eliminated some of the ambiguities governing the legal status of
Member representatives was the ratification of the General Conven-
tion by the United States on April 15, 1970. Before the United States
ratified the General Convention, the legal status of the United Na-
tions and its Member representatives within the United States was
based on the provisions of the International Organization Immunities
Act 24 and the Headquarters Agreement.
Section 16 of the General Convention defines "representatives" as
including "all delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical experts
and secretaries of delegations." But in fact, § 16 of the'General Con-
vention is applicable only to temporary representatives and Member
representatives in transit and at meetings of Committees and Com-
missions, rather than to permanent representatives who are perma-
nent residents of the country in which the organization is located.
The legal status of permanent representatives is governed by the
Headquarters Agreement.?
as between a representative and the authorities of the state of which
he is a national or of which he is or has been the representative.
SECTION 16. In this article the expression "representatives" shall be
deemed to include all delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical
experts and secretaries of delegations.
n2The United States ratified the General Convention subject to certain reserva-
tions. For example, it stated that paragraph (b) of section 18 regarding immunity from
taxation and paragraph (c) of section 18 regarding immunity from national service
obligations shall not apply with respect to United States nationals and to aliens admit-
ted for permanent residence. For the entire text of the reservations, see [1970] Pt. 2,
21 U.S.T. 1442. For Canada's reservation to the General Convention with respect to
the exemption from taxation of Canadian citizens "residing or ordinarily resident in
Canada," see 12 U.N.T.S. 416. For Turkey's reservation concerning taxation of Turk-
ish nations "entrusted by the United Nations with a mission in Turkey as officials of
The Organization," see 70 U.N.T.S. 266. Laos acceded to the General Convention on
Nov. 24, 1956, with a reservation somewhat similar to Turkey's: "Laotian nationals
domiciled or habitually resident in Laos shall not enjoy exemption from the taxation
payable in Laos in sic salaries and income." 254 U.N.T.S. 404.
"Ch. 652, 59 Stat. 669 (1945). This Act provides that Member representatives to
the United Nations shall be accorded the same privileges and exemptions from United
States immigration laws as diplomatic envoys. However, the Act does not confer upon
representatives and their subordinates the same immunities from jurisdiction which
are accorded diplomatic envoys to the United States, but rather grants them immuni-
ties from local jurisdiction only with regard to "acts performed by them in their official
capacity and falling within their functions as such representatives, officers, or employ-
ees. . . ." Id. §7(b). For a thorough discussion of this Act see Preuss, The Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332 (1946).
15For the purpose of avoiding unnecessary confusion and for the sake of conveni-
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3. The Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the
United Nations
Due to heavy work-loads throughout the entire year in the United
Nations, the efficient functioning of the organization would be ham-
pered without permanent national delegations at United Nations
headquarters in New York. 2 The members of permanent delegations
should not be confused with the "representatives of Member States
to the United Nations" who may come and go as the meetings of
organs of the United Nations require. Permanent delegations and
permanent representatives remain to exercise their continuous liai-
son, information collection and distribution functions .27 In view of the
important functions they have assumed, it is surprising that the Gen-
eral Convention made no direct reference to the permanent represent-
atives of Member States. Since permanent representatives and Mem-
ber representatives attending United Nations meetings are both ac-
credited to the United Nations, some members of the Sixth Commit-
tee of the General Assembly maintained that article IV of the General
Convention dealing with representatives of Members should be con-
sidered as including the members of the permanent delegations as
well. But the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Legal Affairs
pointed out that the only object of article IV of the General Conven-
tion was the regulation of the exemptions and immunities of tempo-
rary representatives to the United Nations. This interpretation was
reasonable since the General Convention was intended as a general
agreement to apply equally to all Member States acceding to it.U
Section 36 of the General Convention provides that the Secretary-
General can conclude supplemental agreements subject to General
Assembly approval in order to meet specific requirements of individ-
ual states. It is under this provision that the status of the permanent
ence, Member representatives attending particular sessions or conferences of the
United Nations are referred to as temporary representatives; those representatives
stationed at United Nations Headquarters throughout the year are referred to as per-
manent representatives. When no differentiation is required, the term Member repre-
sentatives will be used.
"In the preamble to Resolution 257 (HI) the General Assembly recognized the
functions of permanent missions: "The presence of... permanent missions serves to
assist in the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and, in
particular, to keep the necessary liaison between the Member States and the Secretar-
iat in periods between sessions of the different organs of the United Nations. .. ."
U.N.G.A. Res. 257 (II), Dec. 3, 1948, II Djonovich, United Nations Resolutions 235
(1948-49).
"See note 25 supra.
'U.N. Doc. A/C, 6/SR (1947).
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delegations and the exemptions and immunities of their members
* came to be considered in some detail in Section 15 of the Headquar-
ters Agreement. 9 Under this Agreement, the United States granted
full diplomatic privileges and immunities to the principal resident
representatives, usually considered the chiefs of mission with the title
of ambassador or minister plenipotentiary. The Headquarters Agree-
ment obviously conflicts with section 11 of the General Convention
which accords only functional privileges and immunities.
4. The Joint Resolution
The Congressional Joint Resolution of 194711 is the final legal in-
strument governing the legal status of Member representatives to the
2'Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement provides:
(1) Every person designated by a Member as the principal resident
representative to the United Nations of such Member or as a resident
representative with the rank of ambassador or minister plenipoten-
tiary,
(2) such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon be-
tween the Secretary-General, the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Member concerned;
(3) every person designated by a member of a specialized agency, as
defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 of the Charter, as its principal
permanent representative, with the rank of ambassador or minister
plenipotentiary at the headquarters of such agency in the United
States, and
(4) such other principal resident representatives of members of a spe-
cialized agency and such resident members of the staffs of representa-
tives of a specialized agency as may be agreed upon between the
principal executive officer of the specialized agency, the Government
of the United States and the Government of the Member concerned,
shall, whether residing inside or outside the headquarters district, be
entitled in the territory of the United States to the same privileges and
immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it
accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it. In the case of Members
whose governments are not recognized by the United States, such
privileges and immunities need be extended to such representatives,
or persons on the staffs of such representatives, only within the head-
quarters district, at their residences and offices outside the district,
in transit between the district and such residences and offices, and in
transit on official business to or from foreign countries.
For the full text see 61 Stat. 3416; T.I.A.S. No. 1676; 11 U.N.T.S. 11.
wThe Reservation clause provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as in any way diminish-
ing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safe-
guard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens
into any territory of the United States other than the headquarters
district and its immediate vicinity, as to be defined and fixed in a
1976]
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United Nations. This resolution brought the Headquarters Agree-
ment into effect for the United States. It contains a "Reservation
Clause" which indicates that the United States reserves the right to
have complete control over the entrance of aliens into any territory
of the United States. The chief argument advanced as justification
for this reservation is the national security of the United States. This
reservation leaves in doubt the extent to which the United States
considers itself bound by the Headquarters Agreement.
Thus, because of the numerous and often conflicting legal instru-
ments governing Member representatives, their legal status remains
uncertain. Member representatives are divided into two categories,
each of which is governed by a different legal instrument. The Gen-
eral Convention is the most basic legal instrument defining the legal
status of temporary representatives attending particular sessions of
the United Nations' bodies and conferences convened by the United
Nations. The legal status of permanent representatives is governed
by the Headquarters Agreement as modified by the "Reservation
Clause."
B. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF TEMPORARY REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
For the purpose of understanding the legal status of temporary
representatives, a comparison of the immunities and privileges which
the host state extends in normal diplomatic practice to accredited
diplomatic agents with those which it extends to temporary repre-
sentatives is valuable. The customary rules of diplomatic privileges
and immunities codified in the Vienna Convention of 196111 serve as
a basis for comparison.
1. Personal Inviolability
Sir Ernest Satow states that the term "inviolability" implies a
supplementary agreement between the Government of the United
States and the United Nations in pursuance of section 13(3)(e) of the
agreement, and such areas as it is reasonably necessary to traverse in
transit between the same and foreign countries ...
Id.
31The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourses and Immunities met
at Vienna in 1961. A Convention entitled "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions" was adopted in the same year. This Convention essentially approved the draft
articles prepared by the International Law Commission during its tenth session,
though some definitions were made more precise and there were some amendments.
Some new provisions were also added. For the complete text see Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, done April 18, 1961, in force April 24, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
For the draft articles and commentary, see 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89-105 (1958).
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higher degree of protection to the diplomatic agent and his belongings
than is accorded to a private person.32 He adds that it is the duty of
the government to which diplomatic agents are accredited to take all
necessary measures to safeguard the inviolability of diplomatic
agents and to protect them from any act of violence or insult., Josef
L. Kunz takes the same view stating that receiving states are under
an international obligation to grant special and extraordinary protec-
tion to diplomatic agents." Though scholars disagree on certain is-
sues regarding immunity problems, they generally agree on this par-
ticular issue.
Historically, personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent has
been viewed as the fundamental principle from which has been de-
rived all diplomatic privileges and immunities. This principle was
codified in article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations:
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall
not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving
State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appro-
priate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
dignity."
Temporary representatives to the United Nations are also ac-
corded the right of personal inviolability. Section 11(a) of the General
Convention states that representatives shall enjoy immunity from
personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal bag-
gage while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and
from a place of meeting."
1E. SATOW, A GumE TO DiLoMArIc PRACrIcE (4th ed. Bland 1957) [hereinafter
cited as SATOw].
-id. at 106.
31Kunz, Privileges & Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. J. INT'L
L. 828, 838 (1947).
-500 U.N.T.S. 95, 110. Article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention is identical with
article 27 of the International Law Commission's draft, adopted in 1958, except that
the word "appropriate" now appearing in article 29 replaced the word "reasonable"
in the Commission's 1958 draft article. In its commentary on article 27 the Interna-
tional Law Commission explained the underlying rationale of the article:
(1). This article confirms the principle of the personal inviolability
of the diplomatic agent. From the receiving State's point of view, this
inviolability implies, as in the case of the mission's premises, the
obligation to respect, and to ensure respect for, the person of the
diplomatic agent. The receiving State must take all reasonable steps
to that end, possibly including the provision of a special guard where
circumstances so require. ...
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78, 97 (1958).
"See note 22 supra.
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The term "inviolability" not only means that the diplomatic
agent shall be immune from any form of arrest or detention, but also
that the receiving state shall treat him with due respect and take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
dignity. Thus, the problems encountered in the application of this
rule of personal inviolability can be discussed under three general
headings: (a) arrest and detention; (b) assault and attack; and (c)
personal protection of diplomatic agents and temporary representa-
tives.
a. Arrest and Detention
It is universally accepted that diplomatic agents are immune from
arrest, detention or imprisonment." But nations have on occasion
arrested or detained diplomatic agents. A recent study indicates
that the frequency of such incidents has increased dramatically since
194511 and the arrests can be divided into three categories: (1) those
cases which appear to be little more than harassment of diplomatic
personnel by detention for periods of up to several days;40 (2) those
cases involving diplomatic agents carrying cameras and taking pic-
tures in "forbidden zones;"'" and (3) those cases involving diplomatic
agents who are accused of trespassing in forbidden zones or of some
type of espionage activities.
2
There are few incidents involving the arrest or detention of Mem-
ber representatives to the United Nations. But a recent case, the
arrest and detention of Guinean delegates to the fifth emergency
special session of the United Nations General Assembly by Ivory
3
7See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
"For example, Iranian police claimed that the arrest of a Soviet diplomatic agent
in 1956 was legal since the Russian was without proper papers. N.Y.Times, March 2,
1956, at 1,7.
31C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 19 (1967).
1°For example, Victor Cavendish-Bentwick, the British ambassador who was im-
plicated in an internal matter, was detained for an hour and released by Polish authori-
ties. For more detail about this incident see N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1947, at 11. In a similar
episode, four United States consular employees were held by the Russians for twenty-
four hours after their boat drifted from the British to the Russian side of Travemunde
Bay in Germany in 1949. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1949, at 3.
"A typical case involved two American diplomatic agents who were arrested Sep-
tember 6, 1948, at the city of Giurgiu on a charge of taking photographs in a forbidden
zone of the city and port area. See "American Diplomatic Personnel Detained in
Rumania," 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 404-07 (1948).
"Three American attaches and one British attach6 were arrested while travelling
through Siberia and accused of espionage by the Russian authorities in 1964. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 1964, at 1; Oct. 8, 1964, at 1; Oct. 9, 1964, at 8.
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Coast authorities on June 26, 1967, has special significance. On June
30, 1967, the President of the Republic of Guinea informed the Secre-
tary-General of the illegal arrest and detention by Ivory Coast au-
thorities. The Guinean delegation included Dr. Lansana Beavogui,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Schkar Marof, the permanent
representative of Guinea to the United Nations. Upon receiving this
information, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Ivory Coast demanding the immediate release
of the Guinean delegation. The Secretary-General stated that the
Guinean delegation was protected during its journey by immunities
provided for in the General Convention. Furthermore, the Secretary-
General protested strongly against the illegal arrest made by the
government of the Ivory Coast. In response, the Ivory Coast authori-
ties released the delegation of Guinea. 3 This incident serves to con-
firm the principle that temporary representatives are entitled to
immunity from arrest or detention as provided in § 11(a) of the
General Convention.
Two factors emerging from the incident are particularly impor-
tant. First, the incident showed that there is no direct relationship
between two Member States insofar as their United Nations Repre-
sentatives are concerned. In a dispute the Secretary-General plays an
intermediate role whereas, in cases involving diplomatic agents, the
concerned states negotiate between themselves. Second, the rank of
the persons involved is not the key element in deciding whether im-
munity attaches-rather it is their function. In the case at hand,
although one of the arrested persons was the permanent Representa-
tive of Guinea to the United Nations, he was in fact attending a
'IThe Secretary-General's letter included the following paragraph:
As you are aware, Mr. Lansana and Mr. Marof were covered,
during their return journey from the General Assembly session, by the
immunities provided for in article IV, section 11, of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by
the General Assembly on 13 February 1946. As for Mr. Montlouis and
his family, they were covered during their journey by the immunities
provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies adopted on 21 November 1947. Your Govern-
ment is a party to these Conventions. The ignoring of these diplomatic
immunities by your Government constitutes a grave precedent, and
if this situation should continue, I would have no other choice but to
lodge a strong protest against it and contemplate the means which are
open to me to remedy a situation that runs counter to the Conventions
binding your Government to the United Nations and to the special-
ized agency concerned.
Report by Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/8120. Aug. 14, 1967.
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special session of the United Nations, and thus was considered as a
temporary representative enjoying only such immunities as are pro-
vided for in the General Convention.
b. Attack and Assault
The framers of the Vienna Convention had historical incidents in
mind when they incorporated the protective role of international law
into the Convention. Article 29 stipulated that receiving states "shall
take all reasonable steps to prevent any attack" on the person, free-
dom or dignity of diplomatic agents. This provision appears quite
necessary in view of the hazards faced by diplomatic agents or foreign
servicemen since political kidnaping has become a popular terrorist
weapon. As a result, diplomacy and the service of one's country
abroad have become perilous occupations. This situation has caused
governments to invoke stringent security measures.
There is no record of an incident involving the kidnaping of Mem-
ber representatives to the United Nations. But there is one case in-
volving the attack by a group of youths on the First Secretary of the
Mauritanian Mission in 1964.11 Although the attack itself was not
serious, the consequences are worthy of mention. Following the inci-
dent, the representatives of fifty-five Member States sent a joint
letter to the Secretary-General expressing their concern. It was stated
that the First Secretary had been attacked "because he was a diplo-
matic agent and because he was coloured."45 The signatories declared
that the continued repetition of such incidents could cause "serious
misgivings" as to the conditions required in order for them to live
normal lives and to carry out their work as diplomats within the
United States. The United States Government offered its regrets
and apologized formally to the Mauritanian Mission and its Govern-
ment. 41
c. Protection
The term "inviolability" implies that receiving states are obliged
to afford a higher degree of protection to diplomatic agents than is
"The New York City police authorities acted promptly on being informed of the
incident and located and arrested four boys believed to be guilty of the attack in
question. The district attorney was prepared to prosecute if the First Secretary would






accorded to private persons." The personal protection of diplomatic
agents normally means prosecution of offenders as well as apologies
and any necessary redress on the part of the host government to the
victim's government. Obviously prosecution of an offender or apology
to the victim and his government can only be accomplished after an
attack or a serious crime is committed. Therefore, the question is
whether a host government should provide protection to prevent any
incident from occurring. According to article 29 of the Vienna Con-
vention the answer is in the affirmative, but in practice host states
often fail to do so. The chief argument advanced as justification for
this failure is the fact that thousands of diplomatic agents are ac-
credited to a host country and that it is very difficult to protect them
at all times. Due to numerous incidents involving the kidnaping of
diplomatic agents in certain countries, however, some host states do
provide secret police or body guards to protect high ranking diplo-
mats.
Furthermore, special laws have been enacted by a majority of
nations to provide adequate means for punishing offenses committed
by individuals against diplomatic agents. According to English crimi-
nal law, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor who by force or personal
restraint violates any of the privileges conferred upon diplomatic rep-
resentatives of foreign countries.49 This type of legislation also exists
in the United States." Since temporary representatives are granted
certain privileges and immunities and are therefore a privileged
group, it stands to reason that they too should be entitled to the same
special protection accorded to diplomatic envoys. At present, how-
ever, special protection for temporary representatives has not been
explicitly provided.
Another area in which temporary representatives do not enjoy the
full immunity of diplomatic agents is the inviolability of residence
and property. It is customarily recognized that not only is the person
of a diplomatic agent inviolable, but also that his residence and his
"See SATOW, supra note 32, at 178.
4STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF CRrmiNAL LAw 96-97.
'-18 U.S.C. § 112 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. II, 1972), provides:
Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to the
person of. . . [an] ambassador or other public minister, in violation
of the law of nations, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or impris-
oned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts, uses a deadly or
dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both.
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property are sacrosanct. Article 30 of the 1961 Vienna Convention
explicitly adopts this position. However, article IV, § 11(a) and (b),51
of the General Convention does not refer to inviolability of private
residences and personal property of temporary representatives and in
practice inviolability does not attach.
2. Immunity From Legal Process
a. Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction
The most important consequence of the personal inviolability of
diplomatic agents is their right to exemption from the jurisdiction of
the receiving state in criminal matters. The immunity of a diplomatic
agent in this regard is absolute, he cannot be tried or punished by the
local courts of the country to which he is accredited. 5 Most writers
in the international law field support this position and it was incorpo-
rated into the Vienna Convention. 3 It can be regarded as a virtually
settled principle of international law." The principle includes im-
munity for private acts. In fact, however, it is rare that a crime is
committed by an agent while functioning in an official capac-
ity-unless it be an act of espionage sanctioned by his government.
Section 11(a) of the General Convention grants temporary repre-
sentatives immunity from legal process of every kind with regard to
words spoken or written and acts done by them in their official capac-
ity. In other words, they remain subject to the jurisdiction of the host
state for their private acts. Here again, temporary representatives do
not enjoy full diplomatic immunity. There have been a number of
51The same provision can also be found in § 13(a) of the Specialized Agencies
Convention, approved Nov. 21, 1947, in force Dec. 2, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 261, which
provides that the "[r]epresentatives of members at meetings convened by a special-
ized agency shall, while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and
from the place of meeting, enjoy . . [i]mmunity from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of their personal baggage. . . ." It does not refer to inviolability of
the residence of representatives. Almost all Headquarters Agreements provide similar
privileges and immunities in this respect. The only exception is the ILO Headquarters
Agreement. Article 15(a) of the ILO Headquarters Agreement stipulates that the repre-
sentatives of Member States to the ILO and members of the Governing Body who are
in Switzerland on official business, shall enjoy personal inviolability. It provides fur-
ther that similar inviolability shall attach to the place of residence and all objects
belonging to the person concerned.
52SATow, supra note 32, at 181.
"Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides in pertinent part: "A diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state." 500
U.N.T.S. 95, 112.
5For a commentary on this article, see 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78, 98-99 (1958).
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
cases relating to immunity from local criminal jurisdiction of perma-
nent representatives and members of their families.5 However, there
is no incident on record dealing with temporary representatives.
b. Immunity From Civil Jurisdiction
Immunity from civil jurisdiction is also enjoyed by diplomatic
agents. The Vienna Convention accepts this principle but provides
for some exceptions." The limitations set up in the Vienna Conven-
tion are: (1) real actions (action in rem) relating to a diplomat's
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
state; (2) actions relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent
is involved as an executor, administrator, heir or legatee; and (3) suits
or other actions relating to any professional or commercial activities
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state which are
outside his official functions.
There is little debate regarding the first exception, since every
state claims exclusive jurisdiction over immovable property within its
territory. 57 The second exception, that a diplomatic agent does not
enjoy immunity as a private person from actions relating to succes-
sion, is based upon the complexity of succession laws and the inciden-
tal interactions of a potentially large number of parties. 8 The third
-3See, e.g., United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also, United States
v. Egorov, 222 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
4Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention provides:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil
and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated
in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of
the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent
is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private
person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions.
500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112.
5TFor a commentary, see 2 Y.B. IN'L L. COMM'N 78, 98-99 (1958). This exception
is subject to the condition that the diplomatic agent holds property in his private
capacity and not on his government's behalf for the purpose of the mission.
5SThe second exception is based on the consideration that because it is of general
importance that succession proceedings not be hampered, the diplomatic agent cannot
plead diplomatic immunity for the purpose of refusing to appear in a suit or action
relating to succession. For further comment, see 2 Y.B. IN'L L. COMM'N 78, 98 (1958).
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exception arises in proceedings relating to a professional or commer-
cial activity engaged in by the diplomatic agent which are outside of
his official functions. It was argued that activities of this kind are
normally wholly inconsistent with the position of a diplomatic agent,
and that one possible consequence of his engaging in them might be
that he would be declared persona non grata by the host country.59
The General Convention says nothing about immunity from civil
jurisdiction. Since § 11(b) of the General Convention provides that
the Member representatives of the United Nations enjoy immunity
only for words spoken or written and acts done by them in their
official capacity, there is apparently no immunity from civil jurisdic-
tion for nonofficial acts.
3. Freedom from Taxation
Exemption from taxation is perhaps the privilege of greatest day-
to-day importance to diplomatic envoys."0 It is commonly thought
that immunity from taxation is not strictly necessary for the exercise
of diplomatic functions. Thus it is granted only as a matter of inter-
national courtesy rather than as a matter of law. Traditionally, diplo-
matic agents have always been exempt from all forms of taxation by
receiving states.6
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention deals with the exemption of
diplomatic agents from taxation:
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes,
personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except:
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in
the price of goods or services;
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in
the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf
of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiv-
ing State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article
39;
(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the
receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in com-
mercial undertakings in the receiving State;
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
59Id.
'oLyons, Personal Immunity for Diplomatic Agent, 31 BRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 299, 305
(1954).
61W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNAM NAL LAW 235 (8th ed. 1924).
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(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp
duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provi-
sions of Article 23.2
Sections (b), (c), and (d) of the article indicate a trend toward the
restriction of this aspect of diplomatic immunity. The functional
principle is converted into a criterion for determining the extent of
the exemption from taxation to be enjoyed by diplomatic agents."3
In spite of the tendency to restrict diplomatic immunity, diplo-
matic agents still enjoy much broader privileges and immunities in
this respect than do temporary representatives to the United Nations.
In the case of temporary representatives, the applicable rule is con-
tained in § 13 of the General Convention." Since temporary repre-
sentatives are present in the territory of a host country only to attend
meetings, it is customary not to treat such periods as periods of resi-
dence for the purpose of determining their liability for taxation.
4. Exemption from Payment of Customs Duties
The view held by various authorities on international law is that
the privilege of free entry for articles intended for official use within
a mission rests upon international courtesy and not upon any manda-
tory rule of the Law of Nations. One of the most authoritative writers
on international law states that in practice and as a matter of cour-
tesy many states allow all diplomatic agents to receive goods in-
tended for their personal use free of duty. 5 However, most states
grant such privileges upon the principle of reciprocity. The United
States for example, applies a "strict reciprocity" policy which means
that diplomatic agents accredited to the United States receive the
same number of concessions that foreign governments accord to cor-
responding United States officials."
S2500 U.N.T.S. 95, 114.
"For more detailed analysis on this subject, see 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89, 100
(1958).
"The same rule is also contained in Section 11 of the 1946 agreement with Switzer-
land. Interim arrangement on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations con-
cluded between the United Nations and the Swiss Federal Council, 2 U.N.T.S. 163,
171.
"1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 803 (8th ed. 1955).
"The practice of the United States is illustrated in the commentary on the Vienna
Convention prepared by the Department of State for a Sub-Committee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee:
Articles for the official use of the mission referred to in paragraph 1(a)
of Article 36 are presently imported free of customs duties and import
taxes under item 841.10 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States
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The International Law Commission in its commentary on this
subject, however, states that insofar as the importation of articles for
the use of a mission is concerned, exemption is regarded as a rule of
international law."7 Furthermore, the Commission argues that the
exemption from payment of customs duty on articles intended for the
personal use of members of diplomatic missions should also be ac-
cepted as a part of international law. 8 It is on this basis that the
Commission formulated the principles whidh were adopted in the
Vienna Convention of 1961. The Vienna Convention, which has been
accepted as authoritative, provides that the receiving state, in ac-
cordance with local laws, shall grant exemption from customs duties,
taxes, and similar charges on articles for the official use of the mission
and for the personal use of a diplomatic agent or members of his
family, including articles intended for his establishment.69
Temporary representatives to the United Nations again enjoy
fewer privileges than do diplomatic agents. Section 11(g) of the Gen-
eral Convention states that the United Nations representatives shall
enjoy "such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsist-
ent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that they
shall have no right to claim exemption from customs duties on goods
imported or from excise or sales taxes." This sentence appeared am-
biguous to members of Sub-Committee I of the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly, because it was difficult to determine the exact
scope of the phrase "such other privileges, immunities and facilities
not inconsistent with the foregoing -as diplomatic envoys enjoy."7 The
Sub-Committee stated that governments had encountered difficul-
ties in ascertaining the exact significance of the above, and that the
two most important matters which might have been included in the
interpretation of the sentence, namely exemption from duties on cus-
and section 10.30(a) of the Customs Regulations. Under these provi-
sions free entry is accorded, on a basis of reciprocity, to all articles (not
prohibited by law) which are imported for the official, non-
commercial use of the diplomatic mission.
Hearings on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), at 59. For
item 841.10 of the Tariff Schedules mentioned above, see 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970). For
pertinent section of the Customs Regulations, see 19 CFR 10.30 (1969).
672 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 100 (1958).
"Id.
:9500 U.N.T.S. 95, 116.
'Record of Sub-Committee I of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. For the final report of the Sub-Committee, see U.N. Doc. A/C.
6/191, at 7-8.
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toms goods imported and excise duties or sales taxes, had been specif-
ically excluded."
As to the exemption of their personal baggage, temporary repre-
sentatives enjoy the same privileges as diplomatic agents. Article
36(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the personal luggage of
a diplomatic agent is exempt from customs inspection." But the ex-
emption in both cases is not absolute. In order to prevent any abuse
by receiving states, the stipulation was added that baggage may be
opened but only in the presence of the diplomatic agent himself or
his authorized representative. 3
5. Freedom of Communication
One essential condition to the proper functioning of a diplomatic
agent is freedom of communication. This freedom enables diplomatic
agents to receive instructions from their governments and to send
home reports of their actions and observations. The agent without
freedom of communication-like a chess player blind-folded-
encounters increased difficulty in every move. Thus since earliest
times receiving states have permitted officials of diplomatic missions
to enjoy free and unhampered communication at all times." The
old rule of law is codified in article 27 of the Vienna Convention,
which explicitly states that the receiving state shall permit and pro-
tect free communication on the part of the mission for all official
purposes. "In communicating with the Government and the other
missions and consulates of the sending State, wherever situated, the
mission may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic
couriers and messages in code or cipher.
' '7 5
When temporary representatives are present in the territory of a
state in order to attend meetings convened by the United Nations, it
is constantly necessary to apprise the home government of the latest
developments and to obtain new instructions or information. For this
purpose, they are allowed the use of appropriate means to ensure the
confidential character of their correspondence. Following this line of
reasoning, § 11(c) of the General Convention accorded the right to use
codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed
bags. Up to now, United Nations records show only one case in which
"Id.
72500 U.N.T.S. 95, 116.
73Id.
"Id. See also, § 11(f) of the General Convention at note 22 supra.
"1500 U.N.T.S. at 108. For a more detailed analysis, see 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
97 (1958). See also, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 110 and note 28 supra.
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a complaint was received from the mission of a Member State that a
coded message sent by cable to the home government had not been
received. It is possible, of course, that this failure was due to an error
in transmission.7
One interesting aspect for consideration is the method of corre-
spondence used by diplomatic agents and temporary representatives
to the United Nations. The bulk of diplomatic correspondence is
normally carried through ordinary post or telegraph or in bags carried
by diplomatic couriers. However, with the increase in the volume of
such correspondence between envoys and their governments and the
need for expeditous communication, several countries have estab-
lished wireless transmitting stations in their embassies for direct
communication with the foreign office of the home state. But this new
method of correspondence is subject to one condition, that being the
permission of the host state.7 7 Although the General Convention has
no specific provision on the subject, it seems reasonable that if tem-
porary representatives want to use a wireless transmitter they would
be subject to the same conditions as the diplomatic agents.
6. Immigration Restrictions, Alien Registration and National
Service Obligations
It is generally accepted that an ordinary alien who lives in a coun-
try is subject to local laws and regulations in the same manner as the
nationals of that state.7 8 The diplomatic agent, unlike an ordinary
alien, acts as a representative of his government and is entitled to
special treatment. Thus, Article 35 of the Vienna Convention ex-
pressly provides "[that] the receiving State shall exempt diplomatic
agents from all personal services, from all public service of any kind
whatsoever, and from military obligations such as those connected
with requisitioning, military contributions and billeting."79
Temporary representatives to the United Nations remain in the
host state or pass through another state only on a more or less tran-
sient basis. Moreover, time is a very important factor for these repre-
"12 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 188 (1967).
"Article 27(1) of the Vienna Convention provides: "However, the mission may
install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of the receiving State."
500 U.N.T.S. at 108. See note 31 supra.
"See the Inter-American Convention on the Status of Aliens adopted at Havana,
Feb. 20, 1928. Article 1 provides: "States have the right to establish by means of laws
the conditions under which foreigners may enter and reside in their territory." Article
2 states: "Foreigners are subject as are nationals to local jurisdiction and law ..
See 4 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 2374.
"500 U.N.T.S. 95, 114.
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sentatives since they are sent for the purpose of attending particular
sessions of the United Nations or ad hoc conferences convened by the
United Nations. In order to reduce the complexity of certain proce-
dures for entering into the territory of host states, representatives are
exempt from such formalities as immigration restrictions and alien
registration. Furthermore, temporary representatives are also ex-
empt from the national service obligations of the host state.8' These
exemptions are granted to temporary representatives, their spouses
and their families under § 11(d) of the General Convention. Section
11(d) makes reference to exemptions "in the state which they are
visiting or through which they are passing in the exercise of their
functions." This language is significant because it requires explicitly
that states other than the host state should grant similar exemptions.
In accordance with article IV, § 12 of the General Convention,
temporary representatives are given immunity from legal process
with regard to words spoken or written and all acts done by them in
discharging their duties, both during the course of conferences and
meetings and also after completion of such conferences and meetings
when their representative status has ended. This latter immunity is
given to temporary representatives in order to secure to them com-
plete freedom of speech and independence in the discharge of their
duties. However, the provisions of §§ 11, 12 and 13 of the General
Convention are not applicable between a representative and the au-
thorities of the state of which he is a national or of which he is or has
been the representative. The rationale behind this rule is that accord-
ing to generally recognized rules of international law, when a repre-
sentative is a national of the host state, he should not enjoy privileges
and immunities to the same extent as other representatives who are
of foreign nationality. The host state must reserve the right to deter-
mine the extent of the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by
such persons.82
C. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
As previously noted,3 the General Convention only deals with the
privileges and immunities of Member representatives to particular
m2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 182 (1967).
811d.
8Id. at 175. In a number of instances a host state has refused to grant diplomatic
privileges and immunities to representatives on the ground that the person concerned
did not possess the nationality of the state he was representing but that of a third state.
"See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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sessions of United Nations bodies or conferences convened by the
United Nations. It is the United Nations Headquarters Agreement
which provides for the privileges and immunities of permanent or
resident representatives to the United Nations. Section 15 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement contains a very general
statement which is the ultimate legal basis for granting privileges and
immunities to resident representatives:
(1) Every person designated by a Member as the principal
resident representative to the United Nations of such Member
or as a resident representative with the rank of ambassador or
minister plenipotentiary,
(2) Such resident members of their staff as may be agreed,
upon between the Secretary-General, the Government of the
United States and the Government of the Member concerned,
shall, whether residing inside or outside the headquarters dis-
trict, be entitled in the territory of the United States to the
same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding con-
ditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys ac-
credited to it . . .84
Under this provision, permanent representatives are accorded a sta-
tus similar to that of diplomatic agents accredited to the government
of the country concerned. The provision makes a clear distinction
between the "temporary representatives" in article IV of the General
Convention and the "resident representatives" in § 15 of the Head-
quarters Agreement. As previously stated, 5 the privileges and im-
munities of diplomatic agents are based on the Vienna Convention
of 1961. According to § 15 of the Headquarters Agreement, the Vienna
Convention also provides the standard for granting privileges and
immunities to permanent representatives.
For the purpose of clarifying the legal status of permanent repre-
sentatives to international organizations, a new step was taken in
1969 by the International Law Commission." A set of articles dealing
"11 U.N.T.S. at 26. The Headquarters Agreement of other international organiza-
tions such as FAO, UNESCO, and the IAEA also contain specific provisions concern-
ing permanent representatives. See § 24(a) of the FAO Headquarters Agreement,
Article 18(1) of the UNESCO Headquarters Agreement and § 29 of the IAEA Head-
quarters Agreement.
"See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
"At its twenty-first session the International Law Commission adopted a provi-
sional draft of twenty-nine articles on Permanent Missions to International Organiza-
tions. The text of this provisional draft is reproduced with commentaries in 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 207-22 (1969).
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with the legal status of permanent representatives was approved by
the Commission and sent to Member States for consideration and
comment." The background of this action by the International Law
Commission is a General Assembly resolution (1289 XIII) in 1958
requesting the Commission to consider the question of relations be-
tween states and international organizations." At its eleventh ses-
sion, in 1959, the Commission took note of this resolution and decided
to consider the question in due course,8" which it did in 1962 when
Mr. Abdullah El-Erian was appointed Special Rapporteur and in-
structed to submit a report on the subject to the next session of the
Commission. "°
Mr. Abdullah El-Erian presented his preliminary report in 1963.91
His second report was submitted four years later in 1967.92 The third
report, containing a full set of draft articles and commentaries on the
legal status of permanent representatives to international organiza-
tions was submitted in 1968.11 At the twenty-first session, he submit-
ted a fourth report containing a revised set of draft articles with
commentaries on representatives of states to international organiza-
tions. 4 The resulting articles which were adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission hopefully will be accepted as a codification
of the modern rules of international law concerning permanent repre-
sentatives to international organizations. 5
vId. at 221-22. In accordance with Articles 16 and 21 of its statute the Interna-
tional Law Commission decided to transmit the pressnt group of draft articles through
the Secretary-General to Governments for their observations. Id.
9An account of the historical background of this subject is contained in the report
of the International Law Commission on the work of its twentieth session. See 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 193-94 (1968).
U2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123 (1959).
102 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 192 (1962).
"The Special Rapporteur's first report is reproduced in the 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
159-85 (1963). It contains information mainly historical in content.
'2 The second report contained: (a) a summary of the Commission's discussion at
its fifteenth and sixteenth sessions; (b) a discussion of general problems relating to the
diplomatic law of international organizations; (c) a survey of the evolution of the
institution of permanent missions to international organizations; (d) a brief account
of the preliminary questions to be discussed by the Commission before it should con-
sider the draft articles; and (e) three draft articles relating to general provisions of an
introductory nature. See 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 133-53 (1967).
9lrhe third report is in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 119-63 (1968). This report consists
of four parts: Part I, general provisions; Part II, permanent missions of international
organizations; Part 11, delegations to organs of international organizations or confer-
ences convened by international organizations; Part IV, permanent observers of non-
member states to international organizations.
4This revised set of draft articles was adopted by the International Law Commis-
sion in 1969. It is reproduced in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 207-22 (1969).
11Id. at 206.
1976]
118 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
Article 30 of the International Law Commission's draft articles
deals with personal inviolability of the permanent representatives
and is largely a reproduction of the provisions of article 29 of the
Vienna Convention. The principle of personal inviolability of perma-
nent representatives implies the obligation of the host state to respect
and to ensure respect for the person of individual representatives.
The host state must take all necessary measures to safeguard this
immunity, including a special guard detail when necessary." Various
incidents have occurred from time to time involving the personal
inviolability of permanent representatives. In 1962 the permanent
representative of a Member State complained that he had been sub-
jected to abuse from the driver of a passing car. United States author-
ities investigated the case, suspended the license of the driver and
conveyed the driver's apologies to the representative concerned."
Another incident involved the Spanish ambassador to the United
Nations, who was beaten by a truck driver when he refused to move
his car from a diplomatic parking zone in New York City. The at-
tacker was arrested and charged with assault. 8 The most recent inci-
dent was one involving Mr. Rossides, the ambassador of Cyprus to
the United Nations. He and his wife were mugged and robbed as they
strolled in Central Park on June 21, 1972.11 This was ironic in that
he was serving as the Chairman of the United Nations Committee on
Rslations with the Host State, which was set up in 1971 to deal with
the safety of Member representatives in New York City.'
A series of incidents aimed at the U.S.S.R.'s Mission by the Jew-
ish Defense League and its leader Rabbi M. Kahane"' merits special
attention. The purpose of the attacks was to protest the treatment of
"Id. at 212.
'12 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 179 (1967).
"Ambassador de Pinies reported this incident to the police of New York City. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 12.
"According to police reports, three men attacked the 77 year old barrister and his
wife, looped ropes around their throats, took their wristwatches and Mrs. Rossides'
engagement ring, threw the couple's shoes into the Central Park Reservoir and es-
caped. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1972, at 19. At the United States Mission to the United
Nations a spokesman stated, "[w]e are quite concerned about this; we contacted
Ambassador Rossides when we heard about this and expressed our concern and I
understand that our people have contacted [Police] Commissioner [Patrick V.] Mur-
phy's office and tried to find out who the culprits were." Id.
,Id.
"'Kahane, in a speech outside the U.S.S.R. mission to the United Nations, said
the Jewish Defense League was forming teams to harass Soviet diplomats in New York
City. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971 at 1. Anti-Russian protesters are waging their war on
several fronts-in the courts, in government offices, and in the streets-in trying to
force the Russians to free Jewish people in the U.S.S.R.
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Jews in the U.S.S.R. The means used were varied: Soviet representa-
tives were followed on foot and by car by members of the Jewish
Defense League;0 2 League members carried signs calling Soviet rep-
resentatives "pigs" or using other abusive terms;' 3 bombs were
placed in cars and at the entrance of the U.S.S.R. Mission; ' and
shots were fired at the U.S.S.R. Mission.0 5 Following these incidents,
strong protests were made by the Russian Delegation demanding
more police protection.' 6 Official apologies were conveyed to the Rus-
sian Delegation by the United States government."' Hot debates and
serious denunciations also erupted in the General Assembly of the
United Nations,"' and some delegates have suggested changing the
site of the United Nations Headquarters."'
The host state does owe a certain amount of protection to repre-
sentatives. However, practical considerations made it virtually im-
possible to guarantee complete protection. It is particularly difficult
to counter attacks by such well organized groups as the Jewish De-
'"2New York City Mayor Lindsay expressed outrage at the actions and statements
of the Jewish Defense League and stated that he would take every step possible to
protect U.N. personnel. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at 1. Kahane was arrested on a
warrant issued after he failed to appear for a hearing on riot charges growing out of'
events on Dec. 27, 1970, but was freed on bail.
101See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1971, at 10.
1'An auto belonging to delegation attach6 M. Globenko of the U.S.S.R. mission
to the United Nations was fire-bombed and slightly damaged outside a cottage used
by the Soviet staff in Rockaway. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1971, at 51. Nassau county
police, after a phone call warning that a bomb had been placed at the entrance to the
U.S.S.R. Mission, found an explosive device and disarmed it. See N.Y. Times, July
23, 1971, at 51.
'Four rifle shots were fired through a window of the Soviet mission to the United
Nations on Oct. 17, 1971. An activist member of the Jewish Defense League, Jaroslow-
icz, was seized by police and charged with illegal possession of a firearm. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 22, 1971, at 45. Subsequently G. Shillian, a 17 year old Jewish Defense League
activist, was arrested and charged with lying about his identity in order to buy the rifle
used in firing the shots into the Soviet U.N. Mission. Charges against Jaroslowicz were
subsequently dismissed. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at 19.
"'In a formal note to the United States, the U.S.S.R. protested the firing of shots
into its United Nations mission. The note was handed to the American Ambassador
in Moscow and charged American officials with not taking effective measures to pre-
vent such incidents. It also questioned whether Soviet representatives would be able
to continue to function in the United States. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1971, at 12.
'N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1971, at 1.
108See N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 22.
'OSecretary-General U-Thant, deploring violence by the Jewish Defense League
against U.S.S.R. personnel, stated that such actions only serve to strengthen argu-
ments of those who wish to move United Nations Headquarters. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1971, at 42.
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fense League. It may well be that stronger measures should be
adopted by host states to ensure the personal protection of represent-
atives."' At present, however, no effective means exist to keep such
incidents from occurring.
As discussed in the previous section, temporary representatives
only enjoy limited exemption from criminal jurisdiction of the host
state. But permanent representatives, like diplomatic agents, enjoy
complete exemption from criminal jurisdiction."' This constitutes
the principal difference between the "diplomatic" immunity enjoyed
by permanent representatives and the "functional" immunity en-
joyed by temporary representatives. In other words, temporary repre-
sentatives are granted immunity only for official and not for private
acts, while permanent representatives have immunity for both offi-
cial and private acts.
Furthermore, temporary representatives are not entitled to im-
munity from civil jurisdiction while permanent representatives enjoy
the same privileges and immunities with respect to civil jurisdiction
as diplomatic agents." 2 The judgement in the case of Tsiang v.
Tsiang"2 illustrates the fact that permanent representatives are im-
mune from the civil jurisdiction of local courts. On January 6, 1949,
a civil action was brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York against Ting-fu F. Tsiang by his wife for separation and sepa-
rate maintenance based on the fact that she had been married to Dr.
Tsiang for twenty-five years and had four children by him, and that
Mr. Tsiang had secured a Mexican divorce invalid under both
Chinese and New York law. Dr. Tsiang, who occupied the post of
ambassador plenipotentiary and permanent representative of the
Republic of China to the United Nations, appeared through counsel
and moved to set aside the service of the summons upon the ground
that he had diplomatic immunity as granted by the Headquarters
Agreement. Based on the State Department's request and the terms
of the Headquarters Agreement, the court set aside the summons.,"
There are other cases relating to the jurisdiction of local courts.,'
"oAbout 60 special trained guards were sent by Washington to New York City to
help police protect the U.S.S.R. mission. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1971, at 42.
"'Article 32 of the International Law Commission's draft articles which deal with
immunity from jurisdiction of permanent representatives is based on Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention. For the text and commentary, see 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 212
(1969).
12Md.
"194 Misc. 259, 86 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1949).
'"Id.
"sSee, e.g., Agostini v. De Antueno, 199 Misc. 191, 99 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1950); De
Miglio v. Paez, 18 Misc. 2d 914, 189 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1959).
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Most cases arise from the operation of motor vehicles by persons
entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities under § 15 of the
Headquarters Agreement. In Friedberg v. Santa Cruz,"' the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court of New York recognized the im-
munity of the permanent representative of Chile in an action for
damages and loss of personal services allegedly caused by the negli-
gent operation of a motor vehicle by the representative's wife.17 In
People v. Von Otter"' the immunity of the wife of a member of the
staff of the Swedish delegation to the United Nations was upheld in
connection with a parking violation."' In New Rochelle v. Page-
Sharp,"I" the third secretary of the Australia Mission received a sum-
mons for speeding. His claim of diplomatic immunity was upheld by
virtue of the Headquarters Agreement and the recognition of his posi-
tion under the Agreement."'
.'
There are other important privileges and immunities enjoyed by
permanent representatives. Article 36 of the International Law Com-
mission's draft articles deals with exemption from dues and taxes.
This draft article is based on article 34 of the Vienna Convention.
According to the draft, except in cases involving nationals of the host
state, permanent representatives shall enjoy extensive exemption
from taxation.20
Draft article 37 deals with exemption from "personal services."
Under this article, the host state shall exempt permanent representa-
tives and members of their respective missions from all personal serv-
ices, public service of any kind whatsoever, and from military obliga-
tions such as those connected with requisitioning, military contribu-
tions and billeting. This article is based on the provisions of article
35 of the Vienna Convention. The Commission's commentary on the
provision on which article 35 is based states that the article attempts
to deal with cases "where certain categories of persons are obliged,
as part of their general civic duties or in cases of emergency, to render
personal services or to make personal contributions." '' The phrase
"military obligations" covers military obligations of all kinds; the
enumeration in article 37 is by way of example only.'
115274 A.D. 1072, 86 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1949).
"'86 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (1949).
"'202 Misc. 901, 114 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1952).
M-1114 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1952).
1"196 Misc. 8, 91 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1949).
'-'91 N.Y.S.2d 292-93 (1949).
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Draft article 38 deals with exemption from customs duties and
inspection and is based on article 36 of the Vienna Convention.',
While in general permanent representatives and members of the dip-
lomatic staff of permanent missions enjoy exemption from customs
and excise duties, the detailed application of this exemption varies
in practice in each host state according to the headquarters agree-
ments and to the system of taxation in force.
Since the draft articles concerning the privileges and immunities
of permanent representatives were modeled on the corresponding pro-
visions of the Vienna Convention, the proposed privileges and im-
munities of permanent representatives are analogous to those of dip-
lomats. Although permanent representatives live within the bounda-
ries of the United States, they are not accredited to the United States
but to the United Nations. The representatives do not enter into a
direct relationship with the host state unlike the case of diplomatic
agents accredited to a state. Under former United States statutes and
traditional practice, no diplomatic privileges and immunities were
extended to representatives other than those accredited to and ac-
cepted by the United States. 2 ' The United States, however, has
changed its policy and practice and accorded full diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities to permanent representatives.
Since permanent representatives, like temporary representatives,
are accredited to the United Nations, rather than to the United
States, the question therefore arises as to why permanent representa-
tives are subject to the Headquarters Agreement instead of Article IV
of the General Convention. It is quite difficult to comprehend why the
exemptions and immunities of permanent representatives should be
different from those of temporary representatives.
Since permanent representatives do not assume the character of
diplomatic agents accredited to the United States, there is no basis
for application of the traditional principle of reciprocity of treatment
which the terms of the Headquarters Agreement provide. Section 15
of the Agreement grants every permanent representative " . . . the
same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions
and obligations, as are accorded by the Government of the United
States to diplomatic envoys accredited to it." Based on this section,
restrictions on the privileges and immunities of permanent represent-
atives can be imposed by the United States in retaliation for restric-
tions placed on United States diplomats. United States Customs
'"Id. at 215.
"'See 4 D. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 419-30 (1942); FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1927, 213 (1942); 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1970).
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authorities, for instance, have on occasion inspected the unaccom-
panied baggage and effects of representatives of certain states on the
grounds that United States diplomats to those countries had been
subject to similar treatment. 125 On similar grounds the United States
has imposed limits on the movement of the representatives of certain
countries.' The Member States concerned have protested these re-
strictions. The United Nations, however, has not been directly in-
volved in the correspondence and discussion between the host state
and the affected Member States regarding these restrictions. Never-
theless it has been the position of the Secretariat that the privileges
and immunities granted should be those afforded to diplomats in
general and that they should not be subject to conditions of reciproc-
ity.127
D. SPECIAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES
Although temporary and permanent representatives to the United
Nations are often treated differently, there are areas in which no
differentiation is made; i.e., they are treated under the single generic
heading of Member representative without distinctions between their
temporary or permanent status. Several areas are of special import-
ance.
1. Waiver of Immunity
Although Member representatives are entitled to certain exemp-
tions from the jurisdiction of the courts of the host state both with
respect to criminal and civil matters, it is now well recognized that
such immunity can be waived.' Waiver prevents abuse of immuni-
ties granted to privileged individuals, which if not waived, would
cause injustice. It permits local courts to entertain actions on the
merits against privileged persons.
Article 32 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
"22 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 178 (1967).
'2 1d. In 1960, when the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
attended the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the United States declared
that he should reside "in the closest proximity to the Headquarters of the United
Nations" and that his movements, other than his arrival and departure, should be
confined to Manhattan Island. After a protest made by the U.S.S.R., the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers was eventually permitted to travel to the premises main-
tained on Long Island by the Mission of the U.S.S.R.
'"Id. at 178.
InFor a detailed discussion on the principle of waiver, see 2 C. HYDE, INTERNA-
ToNAL LAw 75 (1947).
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deals with the principle of waiver of immunity of diplomatic agents.'2
The same principle is incorporated in article IV, § 14 of the General
Convention:
Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives
of Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise
of their functions in connection with the United Nations. Con-
sequently a Member not only has the right but is under a duty
to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where
in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the
course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the
purpose for which the immunity is accorded. 3 '
There is no doubt that in theory waiver can prevent injustice. The
rationale behind this principle is self-explanatory. The questions it
raises are practical ones: Who has the right to make the waiver? What
act constitutes waiver? According to § 14 of the General Convention,
a Member State has an absolute right to decide whether a waiver
should be made. In other words, the representative cannot waive his
immunity unless his sending government consents. Moreover, he can-
not object if his government decides to waive his immunity. It is also
quite clear from the wording of § 14 of the General Convention that
it is nowhere contemplated that the judgment of a Member State is
subject to revision or examination by the host state.
As to what constitutes a waiver of immunity, the General Conven-
tion does not contain a specific provision. The International Law
Commission has recommended that in criminal proceedings the
waiver must be express, whereas in civil or administrative proceed-
ings the waiver can be express or simply implied.'31 The Vienna Con-
vention, on the other hand, requires express waiver in both civil and
criminal proceedings.'
32
'Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides in part that the "immunity from
jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37
may be waived by the sending State." 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112.
'301 U.N.T.S. 22. Similar provisions can be found in § 15 of the Specialized Agen-
cies Convention. See note 22 supra.
'3 tSee the Commentaries on Draft Article 30 of the Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities Act adopted by the International Law Commission at its Tenth Session.
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 99 (1958).
'"Article 32(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "[w]aiver must always be
express." 500 U.N.T.S. 112.
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2. Right of the Host State to Expel a Representative
It is a recognized right of every sovereign state to ask for the recall
of a diplomatic agent. This right is expressly guaranteed by article 9
of the Vienna Convention. Based on article 9, the receiving state may
at any time, without having to explain its decision, notify the sending
state that the head of its Mission or any member of the diplomatic
staff of the Mission is not acceptable. The right of a government to
ask for the recall of a diplomatic agent accredited to it is known as
the principle of persona non grata.1'3 However, this principle is in-
applicable in the case of a Member representative. His accredidation
is to the United Nations and not to the host state.
Since individuals designated as representatives of their govern-
ments to an international organization must enter and reside in the
host state, the interest of the host state in persons designated as
representatives of Members is manifest. Though the principle of
waiver of immunity ideally prevents abuse of privileges by Member
representatives, the General Convention does not deal with the prob-
lem of a representative who abuses his privileges in such a manner
as to become objectionable to the host state. But the Specialized
Agencies Convention does contain a provision governing the matter.
In accordance with § 25, representatives of Members shall not be
required by the territorial authorities to leave the country in which
they are performing their functions on account of any activities by
them in their official capacity. If abuse of privileges of residence
occurs with regard to unofficial activities, the representative may be
required to leave by the host state. 34
In light of this, it would be most unusual if host states did not
enjoy a similar remedy with regard to Member representatives.
Under the terms of the General Convention, in particular article IV,
the privileges and immunities granted to representatives are related
to the official functions they perform. Thus no question of requiring
a representative to leave a country can normally arise based on acts
actually performed by a representative as part of his official duties.
However, when non-official acts are committed which amount to
abuse of the privileges and immunities accorded, it is understood that
a demand for the recall of a representative may be made. 13 5
raIn international law and diplomatic usage, this principle applies to a person who
is unacceptable to the government which is to receive him as diplomatic agent, such
as an ambassador or a minister. See 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 465
(1906).
1'2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199 (1967).
1336 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., Doc. A/427 (1947).
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Nevertheless, it is essential that this power be exercised sparingly
by the host state and only in the most serious circumstances. Further-
more, consultations should be held between host authorities and the
appropriate government in the event that a demand is made for the
departure of a representative. In practice, the United Nations may
inquire or protest if a Member representative is asked to leave the
host state without firm evidence that he was engaged in subversive
or illegal activities.
1 36
In several instances Member representatives have been with-
drawn upon the request of the United States. These requests were
provoked because of serious abuse of the privileges of residence. A
case in point was the request for the immediate departure of a mem-
ber of the permanent Mission of Czechoslovakia to the United Na-
tions because of "his highly improper activities" which had no rela-
tionship with his duties as a member of the permanent delegation to
the United Nations. He was accordingly recalled by his govern-
ment.1
3 7
3. Representatives Possessing the Nationality of the Host State
Though it may be possible for a state at times to appoint a na-
tional of the receiving state as one of its diplomatic officers with the
express consent of the receiving state, the occasion for such an ap-
pointment is very rare today. However, if a national of the receiving
state is appointed, it is now settled that the receiving state must
accord him certain privileges and immunities. The International Law
Commission considers it essential that a diplomatic agent, even
though he is a national of the receiving state, should enjoy at least a
minimum of immunity to enable him to perform his duties satisfacto-
rily-e.g., inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction with respect
to official acts performed in the exercise of his function. The Vienna
Convention provides in article 38 that a diplomatic agent who is a
national of the receiving state shall enjoy immunity from jurisdiction
and inviolability with respect to official acts performed in the exercise
of his functions. Insofar as the granting of additional privileges and
immunities is concerned, they remain in the discretion of each
state. 138
"'2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 182 (1967).
TFor a detailed report of this incident, see 1150 DEP'T STATE BULL. 66, 67 (1961).
IuFor the United States stand on this problem, see Hearings on the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), at 62. See also 4 0. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 517, 541 (1942).
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Section 15 of the General Convention provides that §§ 11, 12 and
13 of the Convention do not apply between a representative and the
authorities of the sending state. 1 9 This section expressly denies repre-
sentatives of the nationality of the host state the privileges, exemp-
tions and immunities that are accorded to representatives of other
states.
III: THE LEGAL STATUS OF UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS
The extraordinary development of international organizations
requires a determination of the legal status of those persons directly
associated with them. These people are engaged in a new profession
which was unknown before the twentieth century.' The people in
this profession are known as international officials,"' but their status
is still subject to confusion. For example, the press and general public
frequently ascribe diplomatic privileges and immunities to interna-
tional officials. As previously discussed,' diplomatic agents possess
special status derived from international custom and usage, whereas
the status of international officials is regulated by international treat-
ies and conventions. States have granted special privileges and im-
munities to diplomatic agents for many centuries. However, states
are not obligated by traditional principles of international law to
grant special status to international officials."'
The legal basis for granting privileges and immunities to interna-
tional officials is contained in article 105(2) of the United Nations
Charter. " ' Article V of the General Convention details the extent to
"rhis article does not contain a specific reference to the principle of nationality
discrimination.
"'The international civil service was created and endowed with rules peculiar to
it immediately following the First World War when the League of Nations came into
being. It expanded considerably with the creation of the United Nations and with the
rise of regional organizations.
"'Some scholars use the term "international civil servant." One interesting book
which uses this term also gives a brief view of the functions of this group of persons.
See F. WOLF, THE INTERNATIONAL CrI SERVANT (1967). In this study, the term "inter-
national official" is used rather than international civil servant.
"'See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
1OPreuss, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested with Func-
tions of an International Interest, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 694 (1931).
'In the proposals drawn at Dumbarton Oaks, provisions on privileges and im-
munities were not set forth but the matter was included in the agenda of the Legal
Problems Committee of the San Francisco Conference. The Committee decided that
the Charter of the United Nations should include provisions establishing necessary
safeguards both for the organization and its officials. UNITED NATIONS JURIDICAL
YEARBOOK (1967), ST/LEG/SER.C/5, 143. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
19761
128 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
which officials of the United Nations enjoy privileges and immunities
so as to function without hindrance, but neither the Charter nor the
Convention define "international official." Suzanne Bastid's 1931
definition still seems entirely valid:
International public officials are persons, who, on the basis of
an international treaty constituting a particular international
community, are appointed by this international community or
by an organ of it and under its control to exercise, in a continu-
ous way, functions in the interest of this particular interna-
tional community, and who are subject to a particular personal
status.'
From this definition the proposition emerges that international
officials possess certain distinctive characteristics. First, they are dif-
ferent from diplomatic agents. The diplomatic agent is a national
official rather than an international one;' a diplomatic agent repre-
sents one sovereign state in its dealings with others. He has immunity
from the jurisdiction of other states since the state for which he
speaks and acts is outside of the local jurisdiction, though in his own
country he has no immunity at all. On the other hand the interna-
tional official does not represent a particular state, but an interna-
tional organization to which certain functions have been assigned by
multilateral treaty in the interest of every member. Whatever im-
munities are necessary for the proper performance of his functions are
necessary everywhere, in his own country as well as abroad; for even
at home he remains an agent of the international organization.'
"'K Nz, supra note 9, at 854.
"'Referring to the international character of officials of the United Nations, the
Preparatory Commission of the United Nations stated in its 1945 report on the Organi-
zation of the Secretariat:
2. If it is to enjoy the confidence of all the Members of the United
Nations, the Secretariat must be truly international in character. Ar-
ticle 100 of the Charter states that 'the Secretary-General and the staff
shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or any
other authority external to the Organization', and shall refrain from
any action which might reflect on their position as international offi-
cials, responsible only to the Organization. The same article lays on
each Member of the United Nations the obligation to respect the
exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the
Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in
the discharge of their responsibilities.
Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. PC/20 at 84-
85 (1945).
"'rM. HIL, IMMUNrIES AND PRIVILEGES OF OFFICI LS OF TiE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 8-9
(1945). Hill quoted a letter of June 11, 1925, from the First Secretary-General of the
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Second, international officials are also different from Member
representatives to the United Nations. Member representatives are
accredited by their home states to the United Nations and not to a
particular state. Yet representatives are still officials of their own
states. In contrast, international officials never represent a govern-
ment.
International officials are appointed by an international organiza-
tion, or by some organ of it, to carry on its work on behalf of the
international community. This organization need. not be universal,
embracing all countries of the world; the concept also includes re-
gional bodies, as long as they possess a public international personal-
ity independent from that of the states which compose them. Thus,
there must always be an element of supra-national representation in
the position of international officials. Consequently, international
officials require certain privileges and immunities from the national
law of individual states, in order that they may freely fulfill their
important functions.
Just how extensive the privileges and immunities of international
officials should be is still a matter of debate, but there is no question
that they are entitled to some special status. Strictly speaking, it is
the work rather than the official which is protected, as the Staff
Regulations clearly state:
The immunities and privileges attached to the United Na-
tions by virtue of Article 105 of the Charter are conferred in the
interests of the Organization. These privileges and immunities
furnish no excuse to the staff members who enjoy them for non-
performance of their private obligations or failure to observe
laws and police regulations. In any case where these privileges
and immunities arise, the staff member shall immediately re-
port to the Secretary-General with whom it rests to decide
whether they shall be waived."'
According to this regulation, international officials are not members
of a highly privileged group. While they work in an international
service they enjoy the accompanying safeguards, but they must obey
all ordinary laws governing their private actions. Once again, the
functional test is the legal basis for granting privileges and immuni-
League of Nations to the Head of the Federal Political Department of Switzerland: "In
theory at any rate, an official might find diplomatic privileges and immunities particu-
larly necessary as far as his own government was concerned." rd.
"'U.N. Doc. ST/AFS/SGB 94 (1952).
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ties to the international officials, though there are exceptions."9
With regard to officials of the United Nations, article 105(2) of the
United Nations Charter is the basic legal instrument. It provides that
United Nations officials shall "enjoy such privileges and immunities
as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the Organization." Article V of the General Conven-
tion provides the extent to which officials of the United Nations enjoy
privileges and immunities in the exercise of their functions. Section
17 of article V of the General Convention sets forth the categories of
officials to which article V applies:
The Secretary-General will specify the categories of officials to
which the provisions of this article and Article VII shall apply.
He shall submit these categories to the General Assembly.
Thereafter these categories shall be communicated to the Gov-
ernments of all Members. The names of the officials included
in these categories shall from time to time be made known to
the Governments of Members."'
The Secretary-General, in line with this responsibility, proposed to
the General Assembly during the second part of its first session that
"all members of the Secretarial staff, except for those recruited lo-
cally and assigned hourly rates of pay" should fall within the terms
of article V of the General Convention."' A joint sub-committee of the
Fifth and Sixth Committees of the General Assembly studied and
approved the proposal at its 50th plenary meeting.' In actual prac-
tice the names of officials entitled to privileges and immunities are
reported to Member States annually in a master list communicated
to the Member States by the Secretary-General. "3
Not all international officials have the same privileges and im-
munities; there are variations arising from differences in rank as well
as from differences in the applicable conventions. Article V of the
General Convention classifies United Nations officials into two dis-
tinct categories. The first category is that of high officials who enjoy
the same privileges and immunities as diplomats. The second cate-
gory consists of all other United Nations officials who are accorded
functional privileges and immunities. Differences between these two
categories merit thorough examination.
"1rThe exception applied to the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-
General. See notes 154-66 and accompanying text infra.
11 U.N.T.S. 15, 24.
1511 (2) U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. at 209 (1946).
'521 U.N. GAOR at 76 (1946).
",2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 118, Add. 1 & 2 (1967).
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A. DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ENJOYED BY EXECUTIVE
HEADS AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 19 of the General Convention stipulates that the
Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General and their
families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic
agents.' The principle behind this provision is not new. Before
World War II, the common practice was to grant diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities to all international officials regardless of their
rank.'55 But the legal instruments dealing with international organi-
zations and their personnel during and after World War II adopted
the "functional principle" as a legal basis for granting of privileges
and immunities. The granting of diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties to high officials is therefore an exception to the general functional
principle.' 8 Indeed, it was argued in a report of the Preparatory Com-
mission to the General Assembly that "there is every reason for con-
fining full diplomatic immunity to the cases where it is really justi-
fied."'5 Full diplomatic immunity is justified for the Secretary-
General and Assistant Secretaries-General due to the vital nature of
their duties and responsibilities.
However, the structure of the United Nations changed as a result
of the 1953 Reorganization of the Secretariat. Based on Resolution
886 of the General Assembly, the ranks of Assistant Secretary-
General and Principle Director were abolished. Instead, a simple top
level immediately below the Secretary-General was created. These
are the Under-Secretaries and officials having the status of Under-
Secretaries.5 8 Before the term "Assistant Secretary-General" was
"'51 U.N.T.S. 15, 24-26. Section 19 of the Convention states:
In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in section 18,
the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be
accorded in respect of themselves, their spouse and minor children,
the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.
Id.
'5 5For example, article 7, paragraph 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
provides that representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League
shall enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities. See note 6 supra.
'5 'Diametrically opposite points of view have been expressed by Percy E. Corbett
and E.F. Ranshofan-Wertheimer on the question of granting diplomatic privileges and
immunities to international officials. See P. CoREz'r, PosT-WAR WORLD 173 (1944) and
E. RANSHOFAN-WERTHEIMER, THE INTERNATIONAL SEcRETAuAT: A GREAT EXPERIMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ADMIUSTRATION (1945).
'"Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. PC/20
at 62 (1945).
'lResolution 886(IX) of Dec. 17, 1954. The scheme was first presented by the
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replaced by the term "Under-Secretary," there were only eight As-
sistant Secretaries-General. 59 Under the reorganized system, officials
at the level immediately below the Secretary-General are more nu-
merous than the former Assistant Secretaries-General.' The ques-
tion therefore arises whether such top-level officials are entitled to the
same privileges and immunities as were accorded Assistant
Secretaries-General under § 19 of the General Convention.
In the opinion of the Secretary-General, officials having the status
of Under-Secretaries should enjoy the privileges and immunities pro-
vided under § 19 of the General Convention. Mr. Hammarskjold's
stand was incorporated in his report to the General Assembly as a
part of the plan for the reorganization of the Secretariat. Paragraph
31 of that report summarizes his viewpoint:
In presenting these new organizational arrangements, I have
Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its eighth session in 1953. See 8 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/2554 (1953). It was further elabo-
rated in a report by the Secretary-General to the ninth session of the General Assem-
bly. See 9 U.N. GAOR Annexes, Agenda Item No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/2731 (1954).
"'Each Assistant Secretary-General is in charge of a department in the Secretar-
iat. An effort is made not to have two from the same Member State. The eight depart-
ments are Security Council Affairs, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Trusteeship and
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories, Public Information, Legal Affairs,
Conference and General Services, and Administrative and Financial Service.
"'Following is a list of officials holding the rank of Under-Secretary as of 1967.
Officials holding the rank of Under-Secretary at United Nations Headquarters: Ad-
ministrator, United Nations Development Programme; Associate Administrator,
United Nations Development Programme; Co-Administrator, United Nations Devel-
opment Programme; Commissioner for Technical Cooperation; Executive Director,
UNICEF; Executive Director, United Nations Training and Research Institute;
Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament; Under-Secretary, Controller; Under-Secretary, Director
of General Services; Under-Secretary, Director of Personnel; Under-Secretary for Con-
ference Services; Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs; Under-Secretary
for General Assembly Affairs and Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General; Under-
Secretary for Inter-Agency Affairs; Under-Secretary Legal Counsel; Under-Secretary
for Special Political Affairs; Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Af-
fairs; Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Officials holding the rank of Under-Secretary at established offices elsewhere:
Commissioner-General, UNRWA; Executive Secretary, ECA; Executive Secretary,
ECAFE; Executive Secretary, ECE; Executive Director, United Nations Industrial
Development Organization; Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development; Under-Secretary, Director-General of the United Nations Office at
Geneva; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Officials holding the rank of Under-Secretary in charge of Missions or on special
assignment: Chief of Staff, UNTSO; Chief Military Observer, UNMOGIP; Com-
mander, UNEF; Commander, UNFICYP; Special Representative of the Secretary-
General in Cyprus; United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.
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anticipated that the officials having the status of Under-
Secretaries will be accorded the privileges specified in Section
19 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. That Section, in providing that the Secretary-
General and all Assistant Secretaries-General would be
granted the privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys,
clearly contemplated that the highest level of officials immedi-
ately under the Secretary-General should be accorded the priv-
ileges appropriate to their functions. I trust that it will be
found consistent with the intentions of that Section that those
who would now be the highest level of officials immediately
under the Secretary-General should enjoy the privileges recog-
nized as appropriate to that status and to the responsibility it
carries.'
Aside from this affirmative view of the former Secretary-General,
there are several other reasons for granting diplomatic privileges and
immunities to this category of officials. First, they have far-reaching
responsibilities for the conduct of activities within their respective
fields. Second, the size and scope of the responsibilities of the United
Nations as a whole and the number of programs which the Organiza-
tion has found necessary have all greatly expanded since the adoption
of the General Convention early in 1946. Thus, in the case of heads
of the subsidiary organs, such as the Commander of the United Na-
tions Emergency Force, the Executive Director of the United Nations
Children's Fund, and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, all of whom are Under-Secretaries, the magnitude and
importance of their functions and operations are such that the privi-
leges and immunities envisaged in § 19 of the Convention are as
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions as they were
to the Assistant Secretaries-General.
In fact, United Nations officials possessing full diplomatic status
are even more numerous than § 19 of the General Convention indi-
cates. '6 For instance, the Commissioner-General of United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and his
deputy possess diplomatic status in all of the host countries."3 The
field representative of UNRWA, known as the Director of UNRWA
1112 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 281 (1967).
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Affairs, also has diplomatic status in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt
but not in Syria."4
Staff members of many missions sent by the United Nations to
Member States have also been granted diplomatic status. One exam-
ple is the United Nations Commissioner in Libya.'65 An even greater
exception to standard practice occurred in Indonesia where the gov-
ernment granted the Principal Secretary and members of the Secre-
tariat of the United Nations for Indonesia the privileges and immuni-
ties accorded to members of the diplomatic corps of similar rank
accredited to Indonesia. 6'
B. FUNCTIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ENJOYED BY THOSE OFFI-
CIALS OTHER THAN EXEcUTIVE HEADS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
Officials other than executive heads and senior officials are
granted only functional privileges and immunities. According to the
functional principle, officials should be accorded only those privileges
and immunities which are necessary for the independent exercise of
their function. The privileges and immunities provided for this group
of officials in article V of the General Convention include immunities
from legal process "in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
performed by them in their official capacity."'6 7 They also enjoy im-
munity from taxation on their salaries, from national service obliga-
tions, from immigration restrictions and alien registration, along with
certain privileges with respect to exchange regulations, repatriation
facilities in time of international crisis, and duty-free importation of
furniture and effects when first taking up their post.'66
A comparison of the Vienna Convention with article V of the
General Convention illustrates the distinction between the functional
privileges and immunities enjoyed by officials of the United Nations
and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents.
1. Personal Inviolability
Under well recognized rules of international law, the person of a
"'In Syria, the Director of UNRWA Affairs possesses only functional privileges and
immunities as provided in § 18 of the General Convention. BUEHRIG, supra note 162,
at 84. In a decree of Aug. 1, 1967, Syria excluded locally recruited staff of UNRWA
from all immunities except taxation on salaries. Id. at 102.
"852 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 280 (1967).
"'id.
1171 U.N.T.S. 15, 24-28.
1I8d.
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diplomatic agent is inviolable; i.e., he is not subject to any form of
arrest or detention in the receiving state. This inviolability also ex-
tends to his residence. The receiving state must take all reasonable
steps to ensure this inviolability, and if circumstances demand, to
provide special police guard. The Vienna Convention explicitly incor-
porated this principle in article 29.169
In contrast, the General Convention does not contain any specific
provision relating to the personal inviolability of officials of the
United Nations. This suggests that international officials do not
enjoy privileges and immunities under international law which are as
extensive as those accorded to diplomatic agents. Thus it can be
inferred that international officials may be treated as other aliens in
the territory of the host state. It may further be surmised that a host
state incurs responsibility only if damage is sustained by interna-
tional officials as a result of acts or omissions of the officials of the
host state whenever such acts or omissions contravene the interna-
tional obligations of a host state.' The fact that international offi-
cials are not granted personal inviolability was recognized by
Secretary-General Lie in 1949 when he stated that United Nations
personnel are not immune from arrest or interrogation for acts which
are unrelated to their official duties and unlawful in the Member
State where they were alleged to have been committed. On July 11,
1963, a memorandum l7 ' from the United Nations Legal Counsel of
the Secretary-General's Deputy Chef de Cabinet reemphasized this
principle: "We should like to confirm that the Secretary-General has,
on a number of occasions, informed delegations that United Nations
Secretariat personnel do not enjoy immunity from arrest or prosecu-
tion for alleged acts which are not related to their official duties
''172
Thus, international officials are subject to arrest or detention by
the host state. Various cases have occurred in which international
officials were arrested and placed in detention. One example was the
arrest of Valentin A. Gubitchev by the United States for alleged acts
of espionage. 7 1 Mr. Gubitchev, an official of the United Nations em-
"'See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
7"See Minutes of the Third Committee of the Hague Codification Conference on
Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in their Territory to the Person or Property
of Foreigners. League of Nations Doc. C. 351(c). M. 145(c). 1930. V., at 237.
"'Press release cited in UNrrED NATIONS JURIDICAL YEARBOOK 188-91 (1963)
ST/LEG/SER.C/1.
1"2 d. at 188.
'"See text accompanying notes 194-95 infra for a discussion of other aspects of this
case.
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ployed on the Headquarters Planning Staff, was subsequently found
guilty and sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison. Before his sent-
ence was initiated, he was deported.' Another case involved the
interrogation of a local employee of a United Nations Information
Center by Czech authorities. The Chief of Diplomatic Protocol of
Czechoslovakia informed the Director of the Center that the official
concerned "was suspected of conduct with a group engaged in anti-
state activities" and requested the delivery of the official for interro-
gation.'75 With reference to this request, the Secretary-General in-
structed the Director "to ask, in accordance with the general practice
of the United Nations, for written confirmation of the subject of the
interrogation including specific assurance that the matters upon
which the official will be questioned do not refer to United Nations
activities or to words spoken or written and acts performed in his
official capacity."'' 8 This assurance was given by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia. The Secretary-General was later
informed that the official concerned was convicted for acts which had
no connection with his work at the United Nations Information Cen-
ter. 177
In 1956, Syrian military police violated the premises of UNRWA
and arrested two United Nations officials. After a period of detention
they were expelled from the country. 78 One of the two officials was
charged with lighting a match at the time of an air alarm during of-
fice hours. The second official was charged with inciting the workers
against the local government, though no evidence in support of this
charge was presented. The Secretary-General protested to the Syrian
government and sought an appropriate apology for the arrest and
expulsion suffered by the United Nations officials. In January, 1957,
a further incident occurred in Syria when a security officer entered
UNRWA's premises and sought to take custody of a United Nations
official for questioning. The Secretary-General once again protested
to the Foreign Ministry of Syria regarding this incident and sought
assurances that the official concerned would have the right of unmo-
'74See note 194 infra.
1112 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 268 (1967). For a detailed discussion of this case, see C.
CROSSWELL, PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL ABROAD 63-99 (1959).
1112 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 268 (1967).
'77Id.
lVI'he name of the subsidiary organ and of the particular Member State are not
mentioned in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission. However, one author
has identified the subsidiary organ as UNRWA and Syria as the Member government
concerned. BUEHRIG, supra note 162. For detailed discussion on this case, see 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM. 269 (1967), and BUEHRIG, supra note 162 at 87.
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lested entry into the country in the future in order that his official
function on behalf of the United Nations might be fulfilled."9 Other
Middle East countries have also interfered with UNRWA. From 1967
to 1969 a total of 128 members of the UNRWA staff were arrested in
Gaza alone by Israeli occupation authorities. Detention or arrest of
international officials for alleged security reasons has seriously inter-
fered with UNRWA's work.
From-the foregoing, it is apparent that international officials do
not enjoy immunity from arrest or interrogation for alleged acts unre-
lated to their official duties. The policy of the United Nations with
respect to cases involving arrest of its officials attempts to balance
the needs of the United Nations with those of the host state. The
Secretary-General has stated that the arrest of an official of the
United Nations by the host state must meet three requirements:
(1) the Secretariat should be informed beforehand of any impending
arrest or interrogation; (2) assurances should be given that arrest is
due to actions performed outside the individual's official capacity
and that the person shall not be questioned with regard to his official
functions; and (3) that arrested persons should be treated in accord-
ance with universally recognized principles of justice. 8 ' In addition,
once an official is arrested, the United Nations insists upon the right
to send officials to visit and converse with the person detained.8'
Some Member States, most notably Israel which was responsible for
the Gaza arrests, have ignored certain portions of this policy.
2. Immunity from Legal Process
Under a generally recognized principle of international law, diplo-
matic agents are granted complete immunity from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the receiving state. 82 Immunity is granted in the case
of official acts because such acts are imputed to the sending State.
Immunity is granted for private acts to ensure the unhampered ful-
fillment of the responsibilities of the diplomatic agents. Furthermore,
there is no obligation on the part of diplomatic agents to testify before
any court.'1
17'BumnUG, supra note 162, at 87.
'Id. at 99. See also CRosswpxL, supra note 163, at 66.
"'For the memorandum prepared by the Legal Department of the Secretariat with
respect to the right of the United Nations to visit and converse with staff members in
custody and detention, see UNrrf NATIONS JURMICAL YEARBOOK 191-92 (1963). See also
BUmEMG, supra note 162, at 100.
"'See note 52 supra.
"'Vienna Convention Article 32(2) states that "[a] diplomatic agent is not
obliged to give evidence as a witness." 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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The exemptions and immunities of United Nations officials in the
United States, as stipulated by the terms of the United Nations
Charter and the General Convention, are designed solely to protect
the independence of officials in their United Nations functions.'", No
exemption from local jurisdictin is provided officials for acts in their
private capacity. In § 18(a) of the General Convention, international
officials are given immunity "from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and acts performed by them in their official
capacity." This exemption is far less than the total immunity from
legal liability of the diplomatic agent.
There are many cases which are directly related to the issue at
hand. The first landmark case was Ranallo v. Westchester County. 18
5
In October, 1946, the Secretary-General's chauffeur Ranallo was
charged in Westchester County, New York, with speeding while driv-
ing the Secretary-General to a business meeting. As an employee of
the United Nations acting in an official capacity, Ranallo challenged
the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that he, at the time of the
alleged offense, had been performing an act falling within his func-
tions, and that he was therefore entitled to the immunity provided
in § 7(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act.'88 The
court rejected Ranallo's argument:
To recognize the existence of a general unrestricted immunity
from suit or prosecution on the part of the personnel of the
United Nations, so long as the individual be performing in his
official capacity, even though the individual's function has no
relation to the importance or success of the Organization's
deliberations, is carrying the principle of immunity completely
out of bounds. To establish such a principle would be in effect
to create a large preferred class within our border who would
be immune from punishment on identical fact, for which the
average American would be subject to punishment. Any such
theory does violence to and is repugnant to the American sense
of fairness and justice and flouts the very basic principle of the
"'Before the United States acceded to the General Convention, the International
Organizations Immunities Act was the legal instrument for granting privileges and
immunities to international officials in the United States. Section 7(b) of that Act
provided that officials and employees of international organizations who are within the
scope of the Act are "immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed
by them in their official capacity and falling within their function." 59 Stat. 669; 22
U.S.C. § 288 (1964).
'1187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1946).
"'At that time the Headquarters Agreement was not concluded, nor had the
United States ratified the General Convention. See note 184 supra.
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United Nations itself, which in its preamble to its Charter
affirms that it is created to give substance to the principle that
'the rights of all men and women are equal'.187
The court further stated that any such construction of the principle
of immunity would go beyond the diplomatic immunity for ambassa-
dors, foreign ministers, and members of their households because,
theoretically speaking, the group is subject to return to their country
for trial and punishment for various offenses. Since the United Na-
tions itself does not have a tribunal for trial and punishment for
offenses such as Ranallo's, the court concluded that unlimited im-
munity would be tantamount to a ruling that such officials should
escape trial and punishment entirely.1" The court further held that
without a trial of the issue itself, the defendant was not entitled to
immunity as a matter of law. 89
A careful examination of the Ranallo judgment reveals the fact
that the issue was not the defendant's identity but rather the charac-
ter of his act. The court clearly states that the only way in which the
nature of an act, private or official, can be determined is by a full
trial. One leading authority has criticized this approach:
Interpretations of Section 18(a) of the General Convention,
and Section 7(b) of the Immunities Act, suggest that the local
courts are competent to determine whether a given act is 'offi-
cial' or 'private' within the meaning of these provisions. The
argument is that if the nature of an act as official or private
were left for the organization to determine, its sole recourse
would consist of the execution, or non-execution, or waiver.
Since waiver is not mentioned in connection with Section 18(a)
of the General Convention, the decision must rest with the
local authorities. . . . On the basis of this interpretation, it
may be seen that the determination of the character of a given
act by an international official passes from international to
national control and endangers the independence of the inter-
national organization .... 190
Three possible methods have been suggested to avoid difficulty in
this area. 9 ' The first is to allow an international organization to de-
"1187 Misc. at 778, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
uIId.
1891M,
1"J. KING, INTERNATIONAL ADMmSTRATIVE JURISDICTION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE Dom~src LAws AND PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEmcA 95-96 (1952).
inC. JENKS, INTERNATIONAL ImMUNTmIs 117-18 (1961).
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cide in its discretion whether a given act is official in nature. The
second solution is to permit the executive branch of the host state to
decide the nature of a particular act. The third solution is to create
an international arbitration procedure which determines the nature
of an act.'9 In practice, these suggestions have been ignored.
The Secretariat of the United Nations, as well as a number of
writers,1 3 did not accept Ranallo as properly decided; nor does it
represent current United States practice as several more recent cases
indicate. In United States v. Coplon, "I Judith Coplon and Valentine
Gubitchev were indicted on charges of violation of espionage laws.
Mr. Gubitchev was a United Nations official of USSR nationality. He
claimed diplomatic immunity on grounds that he had entered the
United States as Third Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the
United Nations and still retained a post with the Foreign Ministry
of the U.S.S.R. 15 The Court dismissed the defendant's claim of diplo-
matic immunity as Third Secretary of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in light of the views expressed by the Department of
State:
Even if we assume that at the time of his arrest defendant was
still a Third Secretary of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
it is clear that he was not thereby clothed with diplomatic
immunity. The dispositive fact is that the State Department
has declared to the Soviet Embassy by aide-memoire of March
24, 1949, and aide-memoire of April 29, 1949, that defendant
does not enjoy diplomatic status. . . . [E]ven if we assume
that he is a foreign emissary and that he entered as such, it is
clear that he was not so received. 6
Referring to the defendant's position as a member of the staff of
the Secretariat of the United Nations, the court declared that the
Headquarters Agreement was the source of Gubitchev's privileges
since he was an employee of the United Nations. The Headquarters
Agreement did not, by virtue of his employment relationship to the
0id.
113Lawrence Preuss is one. This case has been carefully analyzed and criticized by
him. Preuss, Immunities of Officials and Employees of the United Nations for Official
Acts: The Ranallo Case, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 555 (1947).
1184 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
"'Gubitchev's claim of diplomatic immunity was supported by the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington. He contended that on entering the United States he was a Third
Secretary of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that he carried a Soviet Diplomatic
passport, and that he had been granted a diplomatic visa by the United States. 84 F.
Supp. at 477. See also United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
"'184 F. Supp. at 475.
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United Nations alone, confer any immunity upon the defendant. 97
With respect to the Immunities Act, the court stated that the "...
Act does not avail the defendant. It does not confer general diplo-
matic status or immunity. It does confer immunity on United Na-
tions officers and employees for the category of acts performed by
them in their official capacity and falling within their functions as
such officers or employees. The offense charged against the defendant
does not fall within such a category.""' In other words, unlawful
espionage was not a direct function of the defendant as an employee
of the United Nations. Freedom from arrest for such conduct is not a
privilege or immunity necessary for the independent exercise of an
official function in connection with the United Nations. 9'
In People v. Coumatos,2°° the court strictly adopted the principle
of functional necessity for granting privileges and immunities to in-
ternational officials and rejected the defendant's argument, finding
the defendant guilty of grand larceny. The court based its argument
on the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, 21 in
which it is provided that only official acts of officials afford immun-
ity.22 Since the pertinent provisions of the General Convention are
the same as the terms of the Immunities Act, identical judgments
would result today.
3. Tax Exemption of Officials of the United Nations
According to nearly universal current practice, 2°3 diplomatic
1'7d.
93Id.
'Subsequent to Gubitchev's conviction and sentence to 15 years in prison, the
United States Government recommended to the court "that execution of sentence on
the defendant Gubitchev be suspended on condition of his leaving the United States."
22 DEP'T STATE BunL. 559 (1950).
"132 Misc. 2d 1085, 224 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1962), aff'd, 20 A.D.2d 850, 247 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (1964). See also UNrrED NATIoNs JURMDIcAL YEARBOOK 294 (1962). The defendant,
an American citizen employed at United Nations Headquarters as an inventory clerk
of the payroll of the United Nations, was arrested by the New York City Police outside
the United Nations Headquarters and indicted for grand larceny committed in the
United Nations Headquarters. He objected to the proceeding on grounds that the court
lacked jurisdiction by virtue of his position as a United Nations employee and in view
of the fact that the alleged crime had taken place on United Nations premises. See
also United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court
rejected a claim that Melekh, a Soviet citizen employed in the Secretariat of the
United Nations, accused of conspiracy to obtain information regarding the defense of
the United States, was entitled to immunity.
20'59 Stat. 699; 22 U.S.C. § 288e(e) (1964).
"'See note 200 supra.
"'See SATow, supra note 32, at 241.
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agents and those members of their families residing with them are
exempt in the receiving state from all taxes upon their persons, sala-
ries, and personal property."' Similarly, taxes cannot be levied on the
diplomatic Mission. If officials of the United Nations are to be truly
international in character, they must also be relieved from such na-
tional executions as taxation. In practice, however, exemption from
taxation is less than complete for all except the highest ranking
United Nations officials, since officials of certain nationalities are
kept from having even limited exemption by their respective govern-
ments. When permitted, immunity from income taxation is one of the
most striking privileges enjoyed by international officials. It is also
one of the privileges with respect to which the principle of nationality
discrimination has established its strongest hold. For example, the
United States has consistently refused to grant an income tax exemp-
tion to its own nationals working for the United Nations within the
confines of the United States.
According to § 18(b) of the General Convention, officials of the
United Nations shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and
emoluments paid to them by the United Nations. The section makes
no reference to the principle of nationality discrimination, nor does
it give latitude to Member States to determine the extent to which
this provision can be applied to their own nationals. Nevertheless, a
few states, of which the United States is the most notable, do not
grant exemption from national income tax. The rationale underlying
the United States position is that the Constitution gives Congress the
sole power to exempt American citizens from taxation."' The United
States therefore requested that a reservation to § 18(b) be recorded
when the General Convention was adopted by the General Assembly
in 1946.200 The reservation was officially placed on § 18(b) of the
General Convention by the United States when it acceded to the
General Convention in April, 1970.207 It reserved to the United States
the right to tax American citizens and resident aliens working for the
24Article 34 of the Vienna Convention. 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See note 63 supra.
"'Hearings on the Structure of the United Nations and Relations of the United
States to the United Nations Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 504-05 (1948).
2When the General Assembly adopted the resolution approving the General Con-
vention on February 13, 1946, the United States reserved its position with regard to
the Convention provisions on tax immunity for American citizens and exemption of
American citizens from national service obligations. The United States took the posi-
tion that only the Congress of the United States has the power to exempt American
citizens from taxation or military service. 1 U.N. GAOR 454-55 (1946).
-7[1970] 2 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
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United Nations."' Certain other states have recorded the same reser-
vation. 20 The taxation problem is thus one of the most interesting
dilemmas of the United Nations.
In 1948 the General Assembly requested that all Member Nations
exempt citizens employed by the United Nations from taxation.
210
This request was ignored by those states which either refused to
accede to the Convention or which accepted the Convention with a
reservation on § 18(b). In response, the General Assembly approved
at its Third Session a Tax Equalization - Staff Assessment on United
Nations Staff Members, 21 which is comparable to a national income
tax. Staff salaries were raised by approximately the amount of the
assessment; i.e., they were converted from net to gross rates. Assess-
ments, collected by withholding, were to "be applied as an appropria-
tion in aid of the budget.1 12 The General Assembly further author-
ized the Secretary-General to reimburse members of the staff who
paid national income taxes on salaries received during 1949. It also
directed the Secretary-General to provide for the payment of salaries
on a gross basis, without provision for the reimbursement of national
income taxes in all future personnel contracts.213 The Secretary-
General reported to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly in
1954 that the Staff Assessment Plan had not achieved the principle
of equality among Member States. 21
2"Id. A reservation is "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made
by a State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State." Article 2(d) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,
Waldock, (Final) Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 169,
178, U.N. Doc. A/6309fRev 2 (1966). In the context of bilateral agreements, a reserva-
tion is closely analogous to a counter-offer by the reserving state. The most difficult
problems concerning reservations arise when one or more of the parties to a multilat-
eral treaty objects to another state's attempt to become a party subject to one or more
reservations. Article 19 of the Draft Article on the Law of Treaties deals with the legal
effects of reservation. See Id. at 180.
'For Canada's reservation to the General Convention on taxation of Canadian
citizens "residing or ordinarily resident in Canada," see 12 U.N.T.S. 416. For Turkey's
reservation concerning taxation of Turkish nationals "entrusted by the United Nations
with a mission to Turkey as officials of the Organization," see 70 U.N.T.S. 266.
2103 U.N. GAOR 239 (1948). See HI Djonovitch, United Nations Resolutions 164,
167 (1948-49). United Nations authorities reason that exemption from taxation on




2134 U.N. GAOR 359 (1949). See II Djonovitch, United Nations Resolutions 337
(1948-49).
2'"Report of the Secretary-General on the use of income derived from the Staff
Assessment Plan. 9 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 38 at 20, 21, 46.
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The General Assembly subsequently adopted Resolutions
973(X)115 and 1099(XI)2'I which provided a new solution for the dou-
ble taxation problem of United Nations employees who paid both the
staff assessment and national income tax. The new procedure pro-
vided for a refund of staff- assessments up to the amount of national
tax liability. To ensure equity among governments following the
adoption of the new procedure, a Tax Equalization Fund was created
to which the revenue from staff assessments was initially credited. A
share in this fund was established for each United Nations Member
in proportion to its percentage contribution to the United Nations
regular budget. In determining amounts due to each Member State,
however, the shares of govemments that continue to impose a na-
tional tax on staff members are charged with the refunds of staff
assessments to individuals paying those taxes. From time to time,
governments that have not imposed such taxes, and which accord-
ingly have had no charges made against their shares in the fund, are
permitted to use such shares to reduce their contribution to the regu-
lar United Nations budget. Consequently, a Member State taxing the
official income of any staff member or official of the United Nations
is not entitled to a reduction of its assessed contribution to the United
Nations budget.
1 7
This plan eliminates the annual appropriations to reimburse em-
ployees for payment of national income taxes. The United States,
which continues to tax staff members who are U.S. nationals or per-
manent residents of the United States, no longer receives a share of
the revenue from the Staff Assessment Plan. The effect on other
Member Nations is to relieve them of the necessity of contributing
to the tax reimbursement of United States nationals.
The case of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
is uniquely deserving of mention in this regard. First, the majority of
UNRWA's staff is locally recruited." 8 Further, virtually all of
UNRWA's locally recruited staff are paid on a monthly rather than
an hourly basis. Thus they are all "officials" of the United Nations
within the terms of Article V of the General Convention."' The intent
of the General Convention is to grant all officials the same exemption
2110 U.N. GAOR 973 (1955). See V Djonovitch, United Nations Resolutions 216
(1954-56).




2"There were 12,900 persons locally recruited by UNRWA in 1964. BUEHMG, supra
note 162.
2191 U.N.T.S. 15, 24.
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regardless of their nationality. Based on this principle of non-
discrimination, UNRWA claims exemption from national taxation
for its local employees. Though some difficulties were initially en-
countered,2' exemption of UNRWA's locally recruited officials from
income tax is now conceded by all host governments.
4. Exemption of Officials of the United Nations from National
Service Obligations
Article 35 of the Vienna Convention provides that receiving states
"shall exempt diplomatic agents from all personal services, from all
public service of any kind whatsoever, and from military obligations
such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions
and billeting." Exemption is based on the principle that while an
ordinary alien who lives in the country does so for his own purposes
and is therefore subject to the local laws and regulations in the same
manner as the nationals of a state, the residence of a diplomatic agent
in a state is purely on account of his being posted there in the service
of his home government.
In order to guarantee their independent character and to secure
the independent exercise of their functions, officials of the United
Nations must also be immune from national service obligations. The
effective functioning of an international organization obviously re-
quires the continued services of its staff. If large numbers of staff are
called away for military service by their home governments, the work
of an international organization will suffer. This consideration is par-
ticularly relevant with regard to those officials who are nationals of
the state upon whose territory the headquarters of the particular
organization is located.
The question of exemption from national service obligations pres-
ents a problem similar to that presented by exemption of interna-
tional officials from national income taxation. In both instances, the
issue is whether the interests of a state should be given precedence
over international interests.
The General Convention, § 18(c), stipulates that officials of the
United Nations shall be immune from national service obligations.
However, five Member States recorded reservations to this section
when they acceded to the General Convention. 2 ' Laos and Thailand
declared that their nationals should not be exempt from national
service obligations by virtue of their employment as United Nations
mBuEHmG, supra note 162, at 88.
='Turkey, Laos, Mexico, Thailand and the United States.
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officials. 22 In the case of Mexico, the grant of privileges and immuni-
ties to United Nations officials who are of Mexican nationality ex-
cludes § 18(c) . Turkey acceded to the General Convention subject
to the same reservation. 24 A similar reservation by the United
States22 is of greater consequence because the headquarters of the
United Nations is located in the United States. Many employees of
the United Nations, particularly at lower levels, are United States
nationals.
In the case of Switzerland, a special arrangement governs national
service by Swiss nationals employed by the United Nations or the
specialized agencies. An agreement with the United Nations specifies
that the Secretary-General shall communicate to the Swiss Federal
Council "a list of officials of Swiss nationality liable for service of
military nature. ' 28 The Swiss Federal Council and the Secretary-
General then agree upon a limited list of Swiss nationals who are
exempt from military service on the basis of the offices they hold. In
the case of other Swiss nationals, the United Nations may ask for
"postponement or some other appropriate measure." 2
Several states have sought to apply military service provisions to
locally recruited officials of a United Nations subsidiary organ. This
problem is especially important for UNRWA, since most of its staff
is recruited locally. Up to 1965 the problem was of little consequence
in the host countries. Immunity from national service obligations
claimed by UNRWA for its employees was never an issue in Lebanon
since the Lebanese armed services are volunteer rather than con-
script.228 In Jordan compulsory service was not instituted until 1967,
and in Gaza citizens were not subject to military service prior to 1965.
Thus the question of national service obligations never arose. After
1965, however, a conscription law was promulgated by the Governor-
General of Gaza eliminating UNRWA staff immunity from national
service obligations. A definite solution to the problem in Gaza was
212For the reservation of Laos, see 254 U.N.T.S. 404. For that of Thailand, see 231
U.N.T.S. 347.
22See 445 U.N.T.S. 287-88.
2,See 70 U.N.T.S. 266.
'mSee 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
226 Interim Arrangement on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Con-
cluded Between the Secretary-General and the Swiss Federal Council, approved, De-
cember 14, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 165, 181.
2id. For the practice of Switzerland with regard to the military service of Swiss
nationals employed by the League of Nations, see KING, supra note 190, at 47, 48.
mBUzHaRo, supra note 162, at 95.
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never agreed upon, and UNRWA simply resorted to termination of
employees who were conscripted.29
5. Exemption from Immigration Restrictions and Alien Registration
In order to enable diplomats to enter freely upon their responsibil-
ities and to cross national frontiers without any loss of time, an ex-
emption is provided from immigration restrictions and alien registra-
tion. Officials of the United Nations are also excluded from immigra-
tion restrictions and alien registration under § 18(d) of the General
Convention. A similar provision is contained in the various headquar-
ter agreements, such as § 15(d) of the Headquarters Agreement with
the Government of Switzerland. 0
Before its accession to the General Convention, this problem was
regulated in the United States by the International Organizations
Immunities Act. Under § 7(a) of the Immunities Act, international
officials and members of their immediate families were entitled to the
same freedom of entry and departure as diplomats of foreign govern-
ments. A comparison of § 7 of the Immunities Act to § 18(d) of the
General Convention reveals no substantial differences between them.
On December 24, 1952, a new Immigration and Nationality Actzs
was enacted in the United States. This Act provides that any alien,
lawfully admitted into the United States, may apply for permanent
resident status. The term alien includes representatives of foreign
governments and officials of international organizations. When for-
eign representatives or officials of international organizations apply
for permanent resident status, they must file with the Attorney Gen-
eral a waiver of all privileges and immunities to which they were
previously entitled. They retain those privileges and immunities
which a United States citizen, who is also an official of an interna-
tional organization, is entitled to enjoy under the International Or-
ganizations Immunities Act. Thus an immigrant who has applied for
permanent resident status receives only those privileges, exemptions,
=17d.
2"A number of countries issue special identification cards for United Nations
personnel serving in their territory. The names of these countries were not mentioned
in the studies of the United Nations Secretariat concerning the status, privileges and
immunities of the United Nations and its personnel. See, U.N. Secretariat, Study on
the Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and Immunities, [1967]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 154, 275, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118 ADD. 1 and 2 (1967).
=18 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
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and immunities which are granted to American citizens similarly
employed.
There have been few incidents which directly concern this issue,
although two cases have occurred regarding taxes. In 1961, the au-
thorities of a Member State sought to impose "taxes de residence"
on all locally recruited United Nations staff members serving in the
country. Although the Technical Assistance Board Regional Repre-
sentative protested against this imposition to the Foreign Ministry,
the Ministry refused to change its position. 2 A memorandum pre-
pared by the Office of Legal Affairs to the Technical Assistance Board
Administration sets forth the viewpoint of the United Nations and
reaffirms the general contention that United Nations officials are
immune from immigration restrictions and alien registration:
The purpose of Section 18(d) of the Convention is of course to
ensure the freedom of the officials of the United Nations to
enter and reside in any country for the exercise of their func-
tions in connexion with the Organization. The imposition of an
alien immigration fee would appear to derogate from such free-
dom, by making the residence of United Nations officials in
the country in fact dependent upon the payment of a tax on
aliens. The "taxe de residence" may thus be considered to be
of the nature of an "immigration restriction", the imposition
of which is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Con-
vention. Furthermore, the tax in question discriminates
against officials in the country concerned as compared to offi-
cials in other States which do not impose such a tax. In such
circumstances the organization may feel obliged to reimburse
the officials concerned in that State, the tax thus becoming,
in fact, one upon the United Nations itself in a manner which
would not accord with the letter 21 and spirit of the Conven-
tion....
The second case concerned a Member State which required
United Nations officials to pay fees as a condition for remaining in
its territory. The Legal Counsel stated that the imposition of such a
fee was inconsistent with § 18(d) of the General Convention.24 The
authorities in question subsequently agreed to exempt all United
Nations officials.
2 35
n 2See Study cited supra note 230 at 276.
m Id.




6. Customs Exemptions and Import Facilities
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention requires the receiving states
grant exemption from customs duties, taxes, and similar charges on
articles for the official use of a Mission and for the personal use of a
diplomatic agent and members of his family.236 This article entitles
diplomatic agents to exemption from duties on baggage on first ar-
rival and also on goods thereafter imported for personal use. United
Nations officials are granted less extensive privileges than diplomatic
agents in this respect.
Under § 18(g) of the General Convention, officials of the United
Nations "[h]ave the right to import free of duty their furniture and
effects at the time of first taking up their post in the country in
question."' After their arrival they cannot import goods free of duty.
According to the Legal Counsel, however, the length of time during
which staff members of the United Nations may import their furni-
ture and effects depends upon the customs regulations of the country
concerned and the facts of each particular case. 28 Approximately six
to eight months is usually. considered a reasonable period.
2 3
Before its acceptance of the General Convention, the position of
the United States was that the effects of United Nations officials who
were recruited internationally and who were not United States citi-
zens or permanent residents was governed by § 3 of the International
Organizations Immunities Act. Section 3 provided international offi-
cials with exemption from customs duty on baggage and effects im-
ported by the owner on arrival, which might be upon recruitment,
change of duty station or return from official travel. In the case of
entry upon recruitment or following a change of duty station, a staff
member could be required to furnish a detailed listing of his effects
and the contents of his baggage. One automobile and a reasonable
amount of alcoholic beverages could be imported free of duty. All
articles imported, irrespective of the time of entry, were required to
be for the bona fide personal or household use of a staff member and
could not be imported as an accomodation to others or for sale or
other commercial use.2 0 The wording of § 3 of the Immunities Act is
different from that of § 18(g) of the General Convention, but the
n'See note 72 supra.
mAs regards the importation of the "effects" which may be imported free of duty,
the United Nations has consistently mentioned that these include an automobile. See
Study cited supra note 230 at 279.
=Id.
n'Id.
1 Id. at 280.
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effect of § 18(g) is virtually identical to that of § 3 of the Immunities
Act.
7. Exchange and Repatriation Facilities
International officials are entitled to special facilities when ex-
changing currency; they are granted full exemption from foreign ex-
change restrictions. This immunity is necessary because interna-
tional officials have financial commitments in countries other than
the country of residence.
It is interesting to note that both the Headquarters Agreement
and the United States Immunities Acts do not provide special facili-
ties for the exchange of currencies by officials of the United Nations.
Section 18(e) of the General Convention does grant the same ex-
change facilities to United Nations officials as are accorded officials
of comparable rank forming part of the diplomatic missions ac-
credited to the government concerned. In practice, a number of field
offices have reported difficulty in securing full implementation of this
provision, especially when officials have sought to transfer their
money into other currencies on completion of their assignments.' In
some instances, while imposing no restriction on the amount, consent
of the host authorities has been required in order to convert local
currency; in other instances, limitations were placed on the total
amount which might be transferred and an official permit was re-
quired. The procedures involved are frequently complex and lengthy.
In a few cases no means were provided to exchange local currency for
that of an official's own country or for freely convertible currency.2
These cause a great deal of inconvenience to United Nations officials.
The ideal solution would be to exempt all United Nations officials
from such national regulations.
Under § 18(e) of the General Convention, officials together with
their spouses and dependent relatives are accorded repatriation facil-
ities in times of emergency. Receiving states must provide the means
for leaving the host country at the earliest possible moment. 43 The
United Nations has not on any occasion directly invoked this provi-
sion, though United Nations officials have been evacuated from cer-
tain areas, such as the Congo, chiefly with the help of United Nations




11yThe Vienna Convention, article 44, contains similar provisions. 500 U.N.T.S. 95,
122.
2"See Study cited supra note 230 at 279.
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8. Travel Facilities
Special travel facilities are important for international officials
whose function requires their presence in territories other than their
own. The grant of such facilities saves considerable time and enables
officials to perform their functions expeditiously. An emergency
sometimes requires the immediate dispatch of international officials
and a delay of even a few days in obtaining the necessary visas, re-
entry permits or passports can be prejudicial to the organization's
interests. When this issue came before the Preparatory Commission
of the United Nations, it was proposed that an international passport
should be issued by the United Nations describing the holder as a
United Nations official. A report made by the Preparatory Commis-
sion of the United Nations specifically made such a suggestion:
In order to facilitate the travelling of officials it may be found
desirable to institute an international passport issued by the
organization, describing the holder as its official . . . .The
creation of this passport would not, of course, impair the sover-
eign rights of Members of the United Nations in respect of the
granting of visas .... 245
Due to objections that the issuance of such a passport is solely the
prerogative of a sovereign state, the document was named a "laissez-
passer" instead of a passport.
Article VII of the General Convention provides that the United
Nations may issue United Nations laissez-passer to its officials and
that these laissez-passer shall be recognized and accepted as valid
documents by the authorities of Member States. "4 ' According to § 25
of the Convention, this in no way impairs the sovereign right of Mem-
ber States to require visas, but "application for visas (where required)
from the holders of United Nations laissez-passer, when accompanied
by a certificate that they are travelling on the business of the United
Nations shall be dealt with as speedily as possible." 47
The exact legal nature of the laissez-passer has provoked disagree-
ment among Members of the United Nations. The United States
interprets the language of § 24 of the General Convention to mean
that neither the United States nor any Member State is required to
accept the laissez-passer as a substitute for a passport or other docu-
"'Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations at 62, 74 (1945).
For an explanation of the laissez-passer, see U.N. Secretariat, Legal Dept., Handbook
on the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, at 34-35 (1953).
'See § 24 of the General Convention. 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 28.
2,'Id.
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mentation of nationality.24 According to this interpretation, the
laissez-passer is merely a certificate attesting to the United Nations
affiliation of the bearer for travelling and is to be accepted by the
United States as such.
2 49
The United Nations does not accept the interpretation of the
United States and at one point notified the United States State De-
partment that no reservation or restriction with regard to the United
Nations laissez-passer had been made by any other Members of the
Organization. The letter dispatched by the Organization eniphasized
that a great number of the United Nations staff had utilized the
document and that it had been accepted and recognized by several
states.20 It was urged that a restrictive interpretation of article VII
of the General Convention by the Government of the United States
could greatly affect the significance and usefulness of the laissez-
passer.21
Unfortunately, the attempt to persuade the United States to rec-
ognize the laissez-passer as a valid travel document, as well as evi-
dence of nationality in lieu of a passport, failed. The United States
still requires visas of all officials and delegates entering the United
States on United Nations business and requires that all American
citizens going abroad on United Nations business hold a valid United
States passport.
52
C. SPECIAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS
1. Waiver of Immunities of International Officials
The principle of waiver of immunities is employed in order to
prevent abuse of privileges and immunities by international officials
2 4'Letter, Secretary of State (Marshall) to Speaker of the House cf Representatives
(Martin), Hearings, supra note 205, at 504.
2reHearings, supra note 205, at 507.
2°Certain host states recognize the United Nations laissez-passer as a valid travel
document in agreements with international organizations. See UNrrED NArONS JuRMI-
CAL YEARBOOK 43-46 (1963). See also article 27, Agreement Between France and
UNESCO of 1954; Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and
Austria 1957.
"'For subsequent discussions between the Secretary-General and the United
States, see II Dionovitch, United Nations Resolutions 440 (1948-49) (includes text of
Report of Secretary-General on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/626).
"'Recent developments have occurred in Syria over the freedom of movement of
international officials. In 1968 an international official was "prevented from travel to
headquarters. . . though provided with a United Nations laissez-passer..." BuzEMUG,
supra note 162, at 87.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
as well as by Member representatives. 2 3 Its applicability to officials,
however, is rather anomalous:
Since there is no immunity from local jurisdiction for private
acts, waiver seems unnecessary. The official is immune from
local jurisdiction for official acts, but he should not be held
personally liable for acts of an official nature in the sense that
such acts are imputed to the organization. Thus, the official's
immunity should not be waived, the immunity of the organiza-
tion should be waived. The organization would be responsible
for unlawful acts of its officials which are imputable to the
organization. And, finally, the organization should have initial
authority in determining in doubtful cases, whether or not an
act is imputable to it."'
The principle of waiver of immunities was incorporated in § 20 of
the General Convention:
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the inter-
ests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of
the individuals themselves. The Secretary-General shall have
the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official
in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede
the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to
the interests of the United Nations. In the case of the
Secretary-General, the Security Council shall have the right to
waive immunity."'
According to this provision, the chief executive of the United Nations,
the Secretary-General, is under an obligation to waive the immunity
of U.N. officials in any case where, in his opinion: (a) immunity
would impede the course of justice; and (b) immunity could be
waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.
In fact, the legal instruments of international organizations, in-
cluding the General Convention, all make it clear that privileges and
immunities have been accorded to international officials in the inter-
ests of the Organization in question and not for the personal benefit
of the officials. Therefore, the chief executive of every organization
is under an obligation to waive the immunity of its officials when such
waiver is appropriate. In Ranallo's case, even though his act was in
the line of official duties, the Secretary-General nevertheless waived
'See notes 128-29 and accompanying text supra.
nqKING, supra note 190, at 139.
=1 U.N.T.S. 15, 26. For correlation to the Vienna Convention, see note 129 supra.
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his immunity in deference to local law and permitted local authority
to assume jurisdiction."'
With regard to the Secretary-General, the Security Council has
the right to waive immunity. To date, however, no case has arisen in
which the Security Council has been requested to waive the immun-
ity of a Secretary-General.
Two major differences emerge between the waiver of immunity of
officials and that of diplomatic agents. First is the legal basis. In the
case of international officials, the legal basis for jurisdictional im-
munity is found in international agreements rather than in the gen-
eral international law which applies to diplomatic agents. Second,
the right to immunity belongs to the international organization in the
case of international officials rather than to any one state as it does
in the case of diplomatic agents-i. e., the power to waive the immun-
ity of international officials rests with the international organization
for which they work, not with the home state of the particular official.
2. The Right of the Host State to Expel International Officials
If a diplomatic agent habitually breaks the law or if he commits
an act of shocking magnitude, substantial grounds exist for the host
state to demand his recall.21 The host state normally communicates
information concerning violations to the head of the offending agent's
mission declaring the agent persona non grata. Once such a declara-
tion is made by the host state, the diplomatic agent ceases to function
in that state and must immediately leave. The principle of persona
non grata is incorporated in article 9 of the Vienna Convention.28
Article 9 also provides that if the sending state refuses or fails within
a reasonable period of time to carry out its obligations, the receiving
state may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of
the Mission. 59 The receiving state can then treat the diplomatic
agent in question the same as any other alien within its territory.
Thus, the receiving state can exercise its authority to deport the
unwelcome diplomatic agent in accordance with its own laws and
procedures.
As with diplomatic agents, officials of the United Nations are not
entitled to disregard local law or to interfere in the internal affairs of
2"See Westchester County v. Ranollo (sic), 67 N.Y.S.2d 31, 35 (City Ct., New
Rochelle, 1946). See also, Preuss, Immunity of Officials and Employees of the United
Nations for Official Acts: The Ranallo Case, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 555 (1947).
"h1LL, supra note 147, at 258-63.
-9500 U.N.T.S. 95, 102.
"ind.
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the host state. In order to protect local interest, there must be some
remedial procedure for the host state to use in case of abuse on the
part of such officials. Strangely enough, the General Convention does
not contain any provision relating to the expulsion of officials of the
United Nations in the event of abuse of privileges of their residence."'0
However, the United Nations Headquarters Agreement with the
United States does provide a limited solution. Section 13 of the Head-
quarters Agreement stipulates that if the Secretary of State deter-
mines that the continued presence of a person enjoying benefits under
the Act has become "undesirable," he shall inform the foreign gov-
ernment or the international organization which that person repre-
sents. The departure of the individual involved can be requested,
whereupon that person is no longer entitled to receive the benefits of
the Agreement. 6'
According to § 13, Member representatives to the United Nations,
officials of the United Nations and diplomatic agents of foreign gov-
ernments are treated the same by the United States as regards
persona non grata. However, the arrangement which grants the Sec-
retary of State of the United States the power to declare a Member
representative or an official of the United Nations persona non grata
has been criticized on the ground that it is based on a false analogy
between international officials and diplomatic agents. The United
Nations considers the doctrine of persona non grata inapplicable to
its officials. It argues that because international officials are not ac-
credited to the host state, invocation of the principle is not subject
ilSection 25(1) of the Specialized Agencies Convention provides that officials
within the meaning of § 18 of the Convention shall not be required by the territorial
authorities to leave the country in which they are performing their functions due to
any activities undertaken by them in their official capacity. In case of abuse of privi-
leges of residence committed by officials in their private capacity, they may be re-
quired to leave by the Government of the country in which they are functioning. Sec-
tion 25(2)(II) provides: "No order to leave the country shall be issued other than
with approval of the Foreign Minister of the country in question and such approval
shall be given only after consultation with the executive head of the specialized agency
concerned." The executive head of the agency is granted the right to appear on behalf
of the international official who has been charged. According to § 25(2)(I), the officials
who enjoy diplomatic immunity under § 21 of the Specialized Agencies Convention can
only be required to leave in accordance with diplomatic procedure applied to diplo-
matic envoys accredited to the country concerned. Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, approved November 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S.
261, 278.
'Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Re-
garding the Headquarters of the United Nations, in force November 21, 1947, 11
U.N.T.S. 11, 22-24.
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to the restraint of reciprocity. Moreover, such an arrangement can be
detrimental to the interests and function of the organization itself.
Accordingly, the United Nations requests that it be fully apprised of
a government's allegation of official unsuitability and insists on judg-
ing the matter itself.
L2 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, the rationale underlying the legal status of diplo-
matic agents and other privileged individuals has passed through a
number of stages, from the exterritorial standard to the personal
representative principle and finally to the functional test. At present
the theory of functional necessity is generally accepted as the basis
for granting such immunities to diplomatic agents, international offi-
cials and Member representatives to international organizations.
This view favors granting such individuals only those privileges and
immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their functions.
While the theory of functional necessity appears likely to grow as an
international standard for granting immunities to privileged individ-
uals, practical difficulties in its implementation still remain.
Furthermore, traditional rules continue to play an important role.
The 1961 Vienna Convention, the first large-scale international con-
vention dealing extensively with diplomatic immunities and now ra-
tified by more than one hundred states, 8 3 vividly illustrates this
point. It has attempted to codify a uniform practice to be followed
by all states. The preamble explicitly states that the functional and
the representative theories are the bases for codification of diplomatic
privileges and immunites. In fact, however, the contents and spirit
of the Vienna Convention appear more closely related to traditional
law and practice in many respects. For example, the traditional prin-
ciple of the diplomatic agent's personal inviolability and absolute
immunity from criminal jurisdiction is restated in the Vienna Con-
vention, while other immunities such as exemption from payment of
customs duties and immunity from taxation are also based on tradi-
tional international courtesy. There is therefore solid ground for the
conclusions of some legal scholars that the Vienna Convention is
merely a codification of traditional rules and practices.
2"See 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 559 (1950); The N.Y. Times, March 10 and 21, 1950.
See also, BUEHRIG, supra note 162, at 85.
"'United Nations, Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Sec-
retary General Performs Depository Functions (ST/LEG/SER.D/7) as of Dec. 31, 1973,
at 49.
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Yet there is evidence that the functional theory has modified tra-
ditional principle in certain aspects. For instance, article 31, dealing
with civil jurisdiction, states that diplomatic agents are not entitled
to absolute immunity from local jurisdiction in civil cases, but are
subject to it with certain exceptions. Previously, diplomatic agents
had been entitled to absolute immunity in this respect.
While the representative theory is still the principal legal basis for
determining the extent of diplomatic privileges and immunities, in
the case of other privileged groups such as Member representatives
to international organizations, international officials and experts, the
functional theory has been explicitly adopted by various conventions
as the principal criterion for determining the extent of privileges and
immunities. Exceptions do exist, the most obvious example being the
permanent representatives to the United Nations. Their status is
governed by the Headquarters Agreement, which grants them blan-
ket diplomatic privileges and immunities. Compared to other privi-
leged groups, permanent representatives along with diplomatic
agents are the favorite sons of the current system. Temporary repre-
sentatives, on the other hand, are governed by the General Conven-
tion rather than the Headquarters Agreement. Under the former's
provisions the privileges and immunities granted to temporary repre-
sentatives are not as far-reaching. Although they are accorded per-
sonal inviolability, this inviolability has not been expressly extended
to their place of residence or to their personal property. Unlike diplo-
matic agents, they do not enjoy complete immunity from legal pro-
cess; such immunity is restricted to their official acts only. In other
words, they are still subject to the jurisdiction of the host state for
non-official actions. Temporary representatives are, however, ex-
empted from customs duties on goods imported for their personal use.
They also enjoy exemption from immigration restrictions, alien regis-
tration, and national service obligations, hs well as the same privi-
leges and immunities as diplomatic agents with regard to their per-
sonal baggage. As for freedom of communication, missions to the
United Nations and representatives attending conferences of the
United Nations enjoy the same privileges and facilities as those en-
joysd by diplomatic agents.
Closely related to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by Mem-
ber representatives are certain special problems. The principle of
waiver is one of them. It is clearly stipulated in the General Conven-
tion that privileges and immunities are granted to the representatives
for the purpose of safeguarding the independent exercise of their
functions, not for their personal benefit. Therefore, every Member
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State is under an obligation to waive the immunity of its representa-
tive in any situation where, in its opinion, immunity impedes the
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purpose
for which it is granted.
As regards the legal status of international officials, the functional
principle is again used as a yardstick to determine the extent of their
privileges and immunities. Privileges and immunities granted tempo-
rary representatives and international officials are not as broad as
those accorded to diplomatic agents under the terms of the Vienna
Convention. But there are exceptions. Officials at the topmost level,
such as the Secretary-General and Under-Secretaries-General, are
accorded full diplomatic privileges and immunities. Since the Gen-
eral Convention does not contain any' specific provision relating to
personal inviolability of lesser officials, it can be assumed that the
great majority of these officials do not enjoy extensive privileges and
immunities under general international law. As regards legal process,
lesser officials and temporary representatives enjoy immunity only in
their official acts.
A problem which has attracted considerable attention in connec-
tion with the privileges and immunities of international officials is
the position of nationals of the host state who are employed by the
international organization. The question is whether such officials
should enjoy privileges and immunities to the same extent as are
accorded by the host state to international officials of foreign nation-
ality. In order to promote the efficient functioning of international
organizations, all international officials should receive the same priv-
ileges regardless of their nationality. Nationality should not form the
basis for discriminatory treatment among officials. However, some
states have adopted the "principle" of nationality discrimination,
especially with regard to income tax. Moreover, some states do not
exempt their citizens working for international organizations from
national service obligations. Such practices quite obviously affect
adversely the work of international organizations and often cause
great confusion and injustice. To avoid interference with the func-
tioning of international organizations, the proper approach would be
to grant all international officials exemption from taxation and from
national service obligations without exception.
In general, income taxation and national service obligations are
the only exceptions to the rule that international officials, whatever
their nationality, have the same privileges and immunities. In this
respect, they enjoy broader privileges and immunities than those of
diplomatic agents. The diplomatic agent is granted privileges and
immunities in the interest of his native state. Therefore, he is not
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entitled to claim any immunity or exemption from his own govern-
ment. International officials, on the other hand, do not act in the
name or in the interests of any specific state, but act for the interna-
tional organization in question. Whatever immunities are necessary
for the proper performance of their functions are necessary every-
where.
It is evident that the functional principle has indeed been adopted
as a criterion for determining the extent of the privileges and immu-
nities of international officials and Member representatives. The
basic advantage of this principle is its flexibility. Privileges and im-
munities can be changed as functions change. However, the func-
tional test has given rise to considerable confusion on the part of the
courts as to the dividing line between official and non-official acts.
Of course, no immunity is granted for such acts as non-payment of
rent or espionage. But in many situations the issues are not clear-cut.
The question remains as to who is competent to determine whether
a given act is a private or an official act. Is it the representative state,
the United Nations, or the host state? So far this question has not
been satisfactorily answered.
Solutions to the above question have been suggested, but none has
yet met with consensus. As noted earlier, Professor Jenks suggests
three workable solutions: (1) an international organization may, in its
discretion, decide that a given act is an act official in nature; (2) it
is the duty of the executive branch of the host state to decide the
nature of a particular act; and (3) the decision as to the nature of an
act may be left to international arbitration.284 The first suggestion is
analogous to Act of State theory-i.e., an act of an official is an act
of his state. Since an international organization is subject to interna-
tional law, it may be argued that the same doctrine applies to it. The
second solution is founded on the place of wrong doctrine in private
international law, by which the executive branch of the host state
decides the nature of a given act. The third solution is premised on
the assumption that international arbitration is a good and reasona-
ble way of solving international disputes, including the question of
the nature of any given act. All three suggestions appear workable,
but up to now they have been generally ignored. Until this practical
problem is solved, the functional theory will continue to face serious
problems.
Another significant failure of the General Convention is the lack
of any provision relating to expulsion of officials of the United Na-
U'JENKS, supra note 191, at 117-18.
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tions for abuse of privileges in a host country. A possible solution is
provided by the United Nations Headquarters Agreement with the
United States, under which Member representatives, officials of the
United Nations and diplomatic agents of foreign governments are all
subject to the host state's right to invoke the doctrine of persona non
grata. This arrangement has been criticized on the ground of a false
analogy between international officials and Member representatives,
and diplomatic agents. Another possible solution lies in § 25(1) of the
Specialized Agencies Convention which clearly stipulates that in the
event of abuse of privileges of residence committed by officials in
their private capacity, they may be required to leave by the host
country. However, the distinction between official and private acts
remains ambiguous.
While international law governing diplomatic privileges and im-
munities has remained almost constant for many decades, the law
governing the privileges and immunities of international officials and
Member representatives is still in a state of flux due to the inconclu-
sive legal basis upon which these privileges and immunities are
founded. International conventions and national legislation, on which
functional exemptions from territorial jurisdiction are based, have
failed to resolve these problems and eliminate confusion. Hopefully,
the International Law Commission 6' will succeed in its effort to pro-
duce a comprehensive draft treaty.
It is clear that the extension of privileges and immunities to per-
sons connected with the United Nations and other international or-
ganizations is essential for their smooth and effective functioning. To
this end, despite its lacunae, the functional theory has proven to be
an important step forward in the current system of exemptions from
territorial authority.
1"The subject of this paper is currently included on the agenda of the International
Law Commission. Resolution 1289(XIII) of the General Assembly directed the Interna-
tional Commission to consider the question of relations between states and interna-
tional organizations. It has been thirteen years since the International Law Commis-
sion first undertook to resolve this problem. Only a set of draft articles with respect to
permanent missions and their privileges and immunities has been adopted by the
Commission. This set of articles was submitted to the governments of the Member
States of the United Nations for comments. See notes 89-95 and accompanying text
supra.
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